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23 September 1980

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No. 2192

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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

ARGENTINA'S CAMILLION INTERVIEWED ON RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL, BOLIVIA

Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 11 Aug 80 p 8

[Interview with the Argentine Ambassador Oscar Camillion, in Brasilia on 10 August]

[Text] In an interview granted yesterday, Argentine Ambassador Oscar Camillion officially affirmed that the government to replace that of President Jorge Rafael Videla will pursue a policy of rapprochement with Brazil. As stated, the fact that the current president is nearing the end of his term of office in no way minimizes the significance of the visit he will pay to Brazil beginning 19 August.

The incoming government, he added, will essentially pursue Argentina's present foreign policy course, an outstanding characteristic of which is cooperation with Brazil.

Although Argentine diplomats have revealed some misgivings regarding "ideological disturbances" in Latin America, this will not restrict rapprochement with Brazil. In Camillion's opinion, ideological factors have no major significance in the relationship between the two countries.

Although it is only 3 months since President Joao Figueiredo's visit to Buenos Aires, the Argentine ambassador declared that "in addition to the simple rapprochement policy, there is now enough subject matter to warrant another presidential meeting."

Ideological Factors

[Question] The Argentine Foreign Ministry has shown considerable concern regarding "ideological disturbances" in Latin America. Will this be one of the topics of discussion between the governments of the two countries during President Videla's visit?

[Answer] The relationship between Argentina and Brazil is basically sound at the governmental level. Diplomatic procedures are now seeking to establish conditions for a permanent relationship based on the respective

national interests and on the concept that rational cooperation is capable of furthering such interests. A concept such as this, while not losing sight of the stability and continuity of the states' interests, transcends any circumstantial political situation of the moment.

In the period in which we are living, there is a tendency to confine the study of these interests to a specific region. The superpowers themselves are continental regions which operate within regional limits. The defense of similar interests is also being undertaken, for example, among Arab countries and, to some extent, among African nations. The logical conclusion from this is for South America to study its problems from an increasingly regional point of view. This is promoted by both economic and political reasons, insofar as well-advised activities strengthen the trading capacity of both the region and of the countries within these areas. I would venture to point out that the plan drawn up by the two foreign ministries attributes no major significance to ideological factors. The countries' personal interests determine practical and tough positions on any form of automatic alignment.

[Question] Both foreign ministries have repeatedly denied any plan to negotiate a South Atlantic defense pact. In any case, Brazil and Argentina have extensive coastlines to be defended. How do these two countries intend to promote the safety of this region?

[Answer] It is obvious that for countries such as Brazil and Argentina the South Atlantic is of far greater importance than the Indian Ocean and the North Sea. It is also clear that insofar as our seacoasts jut out into the South Atlantic, the defense of their seas poses a problem for each government. It is not merely an abstract problem, if it is borne in mind that both Brazil and Argentina have to substantiate their positions within the context of the [Law of the] Sea Conference, both regarding territorial waters and the area of exclusive economic interests. As a matter of pressing concern, the defense also includes the preservation of natural resources, marine wealth and the substratum. The natural conclusion, then, is that the specific area of naval operations should be, as it always has been, the South Atlantic.

As regards maritime defense of the area, I believe that it is primarily a national objective for which the Armed Forces are mainly responsible. This duty, however, is not incompatible with professional maneuvers between the two friendly navies, which have many experiences to exchange. In their conversations with one another, the two countries have never specifically discussed negotiating a pact and both the respective foreign ministries and the Armed Forces have steered clear of the subject.

No Interfering

[Question] How does the Argentine Embassy view the possibility of President Vidal's visit becoming the target of unfavorable demonstrations?

[Answer] This subject is somewhat fanciful. I think that the rules that normally prevail during a head of state's visit stem neither from diplomacy nor politics but rather from courtesy. Knowing the Brazilian nation as a people, I consider far-fetched the idea that there could occur any unfriendly demonstrations against the representative of the Argentine people's government. I believe that groups which give vent to their biased viewpoints toward a foreign country are, in fact, assuming deplorable obtrusive positions in areas which do not concern them. I believe that this practice should be done away with once and for all in Latin American countries which are historically most persistent in rejecting interfering in their domestic problems. No one is in a position to teach anyone a lesson.

[Question] Has the Argentine Embassy already taken steps to help locate the Argentine priest, Jorge Adur, who is said to have disappeared in Brazil?

[Answer] There is no record whatsoever, either through official channels or through ecclesiastical channels of this priest's whereabouts in Brazil.

[Question] How are we to interpret the dispatch with which the Argentine government decided to return President Figueiredo's visit to Buenos Aires, made only 3 months ago?

[Answer] That is due to the fact that the two parties found it expedient to pursue the Buenos Aires conversations immediately. It was also taken into consideration that on reorganizing the Argentine government, they would need time to define their priorities. As a rule, no new president travels immediately after taking office. This makes the date set for the Argentine president's visit to Brazil a suitable one, even though we are practically on the eve of the Argentine presidential inauguration. Moreover, it is generally believed that in addition to the purely political event, there is enough material to warrant a presidential meeting.

Pertinent Points

[Question] Politically, what are the pertinent aspects of President Videla's visit to Brazil?

[Answer] The two countries have given adequate proof that in diplomatic areas there exists a very favorable climate which puts an end to many seeming conflicts frequently based on misunderstandings, on the lack of communication or merely on the lack of information from both sides. It is a well-established fact that in responsible diplomatic areas and in broad terms there is today a very constructive climate for the rational analysis of mutual concerns. Confidence on the government level has broadened its range to include technical areas such as commerce, finances, science and technology. I feel sure that it will also extend to the areas of the arts and intellectual creativity. I would say that this is a vital political fact which is strengthened in meetings such as this one.

[Question] If we consider that President Videla is at the end of his term of office, what assurances have we that the next Argentine government continue this climate of rapprochement with Brazil?

[Answer] I have every reason to believe very firmly that the international policy of the next Argentine government, no matter who the next president may be, will follow the present lines, not only because it can be reasonably considered a practical, overt line, but especially because it was not the decision of one isolated person. It is obvious that President Videla has been very decisive regarding this global policy. However, he is part of a decision-making system where individual influence is significantly low. International policy, in particular, has resulted from agreements among pertinent sectors of Argentine power. The next government will also be the expression of this system. It is to be expected that he will here embody certain nuances indicative of his own personal style, but it stands to reason to presume that the basic lines--from among which emanated the policy with Brazil--will be maintained.

Preference

[Question] How do you explain that President Videla has stated that he prefers the present government in Bolivia to that which was elected by popular vote?

[Answer] A long historical experience with neighboring countries arouses in us an instinctive liking for the government which is now in power because we must establish relations with the neighboring countries. Unfortunately, in Latin America's present phase, there does not exist, as a rule, a 100-percent guarantee of stability. In this case, the only choice the government has is to accept things as they actually are beyond their own borders. As far as I can recall, all the changes undergone in the Bolivian proceedings gave grounds for suspecting interference, owing to the affinity demonstrated by more powerful neighboring and nonneighboring countries. This happened, for example in 1944 and in 1952 when General Barrientos overthrew Paz Estensoro, when Barrientos died and so on one after the other. I believe that a good plausible assumption would be to think that the facts of Bolivian history concern, first of all, the Bolivian people, their social, economic conditions and the interests of the country. That is the present situation. No one, in fact, has the right to say that he likes or does not like a particular country. This would be conducive to subjecting international relations among states, which are permanent, to critical phases caused by foreign domestic policy regarding which no one, as a last resort, is in a position to intervene. The only sound rule in international policy is simply to accept events within other nations' boundaries as they occur. Otherwise, international policy would, as a last resort, become subject to discontinuous procedures and disguised party maneuvers involving interfering mechanisms.

[Question] On the economic level, how will the transformation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) into the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) improve trade between Brazil and Argentina?

[Answer] It was evident that the multilateral mechanisms based on the compulsory use of the most-favored nation stipulation had petered out. The joint objective to organize a free-trade zone became paralyzed immediately after its first and only meeting. Reforms which attempted to internationalize the Caracas protocol were restricted to postponing the initial time limits. It was, therefore, concluded that the multiplication of trade lines is practicable only through the establishment of nonextendable bilateral mechanisms. The experiment showed that many bilateral concessions failed because of the obligation to extend privileges to all members of the organization. Consequently, from now on it will be stipulated that countries grant trade-promoting concessions based on better-adjusted estimates, transacted on a bilateral basis.

8870

CSO: 3001

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

CUBAN EQUIPMENT TO GRENADA--More equipment has arrived in Grenada from Cuba for continuing the construction of the international airport. The equipment arrived in St George's Harbor last Saturday on board the Cuban Vessel (Antola). [Excerpt] [FLO20234 St George's Radio Free Grenada in English 2330 GMT 1 Sep 80]

ST LUCIA'S THANKS GRENADA--Prime Minister Alan Louisy of St Lucia has expressed thanks to the government and people of Grenada for gifts received to assist the island to recover from hurricane Allen. The information was contained in the 20 August issue of the government information bulletin in St Lucia. [FLO20234 St George's Radio Free Grenada in English 2330 GMT 1 Sep 80]

RECONSTRUCTION MEETING--Grenada's Agriculture Minister Unison Whiteman and counterparts from the other Windward Islands (?met) with representatives from a number of international aid agencies in Barbados today. The meeting was called by the ministers in an effort to jointly seek aid in reconstruction after hurricane Allen. Six aid organizations attended the meeting today. They were the Canadian International Development Agency, the British Development Division, the United States Agency for International Development, the European Economic Community and the Organization of American States. [FL100051 St George's Radio Free Grenada in English 2330 GMT 9 Sep 80]

CSO: 3020

EFFECTS OF CANCELLATION OF BOWDLER VISIT VIEWED

Buenos Aires CONVICCION in Spanish 31 Jul 80 p 1

[Article by Pascual Albanese: "Umbra in Relations With Washington"]

[Text] U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro moved up his return to the United States, which he had delayed because of the canceled visit to Buenos Aires of William Bowdler, deputy undersecretary of state for Latin American affairs, whose trip was undoubtedly postponed in keeping with the State Department's annoyance at Argentina for having been the first country in the world to recognize the new Bolivian military regime.

Before leaving, Castro himself acknowledged that the cancellation of the trip caused a "momentary interruption" in the bilateral relations and a "certain resentment" on the part of the Argentine Government, which officially chose not to give out any information about the episode; all information given to the news media had only one source, the U.S. Embassy.

Simultaneously, diplomatic sources in Washington, whose opinions are transmitted by UPI, insisted on alluding to Argentina's alleged official support for the overthrow of President Lidia Gueiler. A UPI cable went so far as to hazard the opinion that "although it has not been confirmed, the most specific rumors in this regard indicate that Argentine military transport planes took quantities of food to the Bolivian soldiers."

As a matter of fact, Castro's return implies that the United States has no ambassador to Argentina. The arrival of Klaus Ruser, who was left in charge of the diplomatic legation, does not fill the void since, although he is an experienced official, the rank of ambassador is lacking from a protocol standpoint.

In this context, the system of bilateral consultation established at the time of the "Goodpaster mission" would seem to be about to collapse. Amidst the internal wrangling among factions in the State Department, the new situation could very well be used to advantage by "hard-line" partisans with reference to the Argentine leaders. This "hard-line" sector which may recover the ground lost during the last few months.

James Carter is faced with a serious dilemma. To appoint a new ambassador over the short term would be interpreted as a sign of thawing at a time when U.S. diplomacy is exerting all its influence to create a "cordon sanitaire" around Bolivia with the efficient cooperation of the Andean Pact nations. In turn, to leave the embassy vacant until after the presidential elections in November would mean opening the gap for the dreaded penetration of the USSR, a point about which Washington has become even more sensitive since the visit of Yuriy Fokin, secretary general of the Soviet foreign ministry.

Therefore, an unknown factor which is difficult to determine is whether the cooling off in relations will or will not last until October, at which time the OAS General Assembly will discuss the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights pertaining to Argentina, an issue which is now dormant but which, under these conditions, may be resurrected.

Apparently, the development of the Bolivian case will have considerable influence on clearing up the impasse. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: Although in January of this year official spokesman enthusiastically declared that in the future Argentine-U.S. relations would be analyzed before and after Goodpaster's visit, there is no doubt that it will now be necessary to speak of our ties with the United States before and after Bowdler's "nonvisit."

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CSO: 3010

PURPOSE OF SOVIET SECRETARY'S VISIT DISCUSSED

Buenos Aires CONVICCION in Spanish 30 Jul 80 p 11

[Article by Martin Olivera]

[Text] With the same secrecy with which it began--in fact, with which it was planned--the visit of Yuriy Fokin, secretary general of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, to Buenos Aires took place yesterday as scheduled.

Curiously, neither the San Martin Palace nor the Soviet Embassy nor the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), which the Soviet official was to visit, added any information yesterday to the brief reference to the visit made on Monday.

According to that brief reference, the Kremlin diplomat had arrived in Buenos Aires for the purpose of talking about the agenda of the next meeting of the United Nations, as has been traditionally done for the last several years.

Since no one could recall such an event--without exception, none of the sources contacted by CONVICCION believes that these meetings are traditional--Soviet spokesmen asserted yesterday that not only are such meetings customary but that, moreover, one of these diplomatic exchanges resulted in getting the Soviets to support the appointment, at that time, of Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas as chairman of the disarmament conference.

To be precise, the Soviets are now saying, the principal reason for Fokin's visit to Argentina is to obtain our country's support for the next disarmament project which the Warsaw Pact will present to the UN General Assembly in September 1980.

The sources stressed that this procedure is customary when it is a question of meetings with friendly countries.

Another semiofficial reason for the trip was to discuss the next meeting of the Nonproliferation Treaty Conference (TNP)--since the USSR might also begin to supply Argentina with enriched uranium--in which connection Fokin reportedly had plans to meet with the CNEA leadership.

On this point there is such a lack of information that it was not possible to ascertain whether the meetings did in fact take place along with the publicized trip through Atucha. When asked, the CNEA turned people over to the Foreign Ministry. At the San Martin Palace they kindly said that they knew nothing.

Nevertheless, a precedent was set in Brazil, where Fokin officially discussed the subject of nuclear energy. It is almost certain that he came to Argentina with the same proposal, and it is certain that the cancellation of William Bowdler's visit may have greatly facilitated his task.

Another point which may have held more interest for Fokin, in view of Bowdler's attitude, is the provision of turbines for Yacyreta where, at present, the American firm Allis Chalmers appears to be the sure winner. It is probable that Fokin is now thinking in terms of the weakening of Washington-Buenos Aires relations and trying to offer some advantages for strengthening Buenos Aires-Moscow relations, which are in a state of steady growth.

Lastly, and although it has not been said officially, certain parties connected with the Soviet circle have acknowledged that a subject of special interest to Fokin is the regional situation and particularly Bolivia's future.

According to these reports, the Kremlin has come to the conclusion that the international isolation with which General Garcia Meza's government is being faced and will be faced may facilitate a Moscow-La Paz dialog, which would fit in with the Soviet strategy of broadening its presence in Latin America.

Again according to those spokesmen, Fokin has allegedly stated that Moscow's position toward the coup d'etat is similar to that of Buenos Aires, since the doctrine it supports is very much like the Estrada doctrine. In other words, conditions are propitious for Moscow to recognize La Paz.

What the Kremlin wants to be assured of is that Garcia Meza will extend his hand toward the communist capital. Judging by the Soviet sources, Fokin will leave Buenos Aires with "his mission accomplished."

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CSO: 3010

ARGENTINA

PAPER LAUDS NEW GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TOWARD MIDDLE EAST

Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 13 Aug 80 p 8

[Text] Reports from Jerusalem last week indicated that the Israeli minister of industry, commerce and tourism, who was then in Buenos Aires, had informed the Jewish press that Argentina would not recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), he had been told by Foreign Minister Carlos Washington Pastor. This statement was not denied by the San Martin Palace. Argentina, that source said, reiterating the words of our foreign minister, "will only support the moderate Palestinian leaders on the West Bank and in Gaza."

The source of this report and the fact that it was not corrected or challenged in official circles reveal that an attitude has been adopted which in many ways will contribute to clarifying the Argentine policy on the Middle East. Despite the intensive and increasing trade links, including sales of military equipment between Israel and Argentina, our country's conduct in the Arab-Israeli conflict has not always taken on the clear profile which it should have, despite the close relations existing between the Arab terrorist organizations and the subversive leaders, wanted because of their crimes by the courts in our country. It is known moreover that the PLO, which includes various Moslem terrorist groups, is the support center for dozens of organizations in many parts of the world which have the responsibility, as a part of a concerted plan, for destroying political stability in the West. A short time ago we referred to a report provided by the British writer Robert Moss, to the effect that in the PLO training camps contingents of guerrilla fighters from many countries, including, among others, many Argentines in the Montonero group, are continuing to be trained.

The existence of these links, known to our authorities, made the Argentine foreign policy in the Levant, as revealed in many of the votes within the United Nations, difficult to understand.

The announcement that Argentina will not recognize the PLO might prove an encouraging indication if it were followed by other steps designed to establish the conduct to be pursued by our country in some realms of

international policy more precisely. We are referring in particular to our continued participation in the group of nonaligned countries headed by Fidel Castro, despite profound differences with the majority of the nations it includes and in violation of the "Western and Christian" characteristics so often mentioned in official speeches as distinguishing Argentina.

The attitude announced by Argentina, according to the report from Jerusalem, came a few days after the vote in the UN on a resolution demanding that Israel withdraw, prior to 15 November, from all the Arab territories occupied since the "6-day war," but without the guarantee as provided in earlier documents of this highest international body of "safe and recognized frontiers," i.e. in substance recognition of the state by the countries of the Arab world. It is remarkable that this UN vote coincides with the resolution adopted by the PLO at its last meeting in Damascus reiterating its decision to take over the whole of the territory of Palestine, including Israel, by means of acts of war and extermination. The vote in Damascus marks the finish of Arafat's "mannerly" campaign in the European foreign ministries with a view to winning diplomatic status. The UN resolution to which we refer calls for the surrender of the "irredentist" territories to the government of the PLO.

It is on this point precisely that the new Argentine attitude takes on its true value as a promise of correction, with the statement that there will be no recognition of the PLO and the issuance of support of only "moderate Palestinian leaders on the West Bank and in Gaza."

The new attitude of the Argentine Foreign Ministry on the Middle East conflict would seem to be oriented toward other consistent steps, in view of the fact that the former laborite prime minister of Israel, Itzhak Rabin, was invited to speak at the national military college this week by the general staff of the Argentine army.

Confirming its known position on the matter, the Socialist International, in which Israel participates, has condemned Rabin's decision to accept the invitation extended. There can be no doubt of the "foundation" for the resolution by the International, attacking the attitude adopted by some of its members with regard to the Argentine Montoneros and their support of the cause of the PLO as the "true representative of the Palestinian people." Thus the Socialist International remains faithful to its pattern of promoting the prestige of two preserves of socialism, one with democratic roots in Europe and another with shades ranging between populism and authoritarianism outside the old continent. It is not then so much an inconsistency as a tactic within the framework of a strategy designed to compete for "customers" and weight with communism in some key regions of the world.

5157

CSO: 3010

CAUTION URGED TOWARD PROPOSED CHANGES IN URUGUAY'S CONSTITUTION

Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 28 Jul 80 p 6

[Editorial: "Uruguayan Political Institutions"]

[Text] Since the beginning of its independence, the neighboring republic of Uruguay has been characterized by its struggles in defense of freedom and by the consolidation of its democratic institutions. Law and justice have protected all its residents equally, and they have provided protection and security for many foreigners who, due to insurmountable political contingencies, had to leave their native land, almost always as victims of cruel persecution. This explains why, after the vicissitudes the neighboring country underwent in the not-too-distant past as a result of subversive and terrorist action, the American community in particular feels the weight of the problems which afflict that country as though they were its own.

The preceding makes observers all the more certain that Uruguayan political institutions will continue to be an exponent of these noble traditions. Moreover, this is borne out by efforts being made by the most influential civic groups in the country to prevent certain announced constitutional reforms from weakening the republican and democratic principles which have governed its institutional development for many decades. Recent information confirms the undesirable nature of the changes proposed by official spheres as well as the resistance those changes have encountered from almost all sectors of the population.

Opposition to the new constitution is particularly directed toward the guidelines for the establishment of a collegiate organization which would control all government bodies, with the functions of a constitutional tribunal. The Blanco Party has declared that the tribunal plan "attacks the republican essence of the system" and that it would be "a veritable super-government which would lord over the entire administration with universal powers and with no one to control its actions." Such a tribunal "is absolutely inadmissible" and "without precedent in the constitutional law of the democratic world. With this reform, it adds, "very little would remain of the separation of powers--the foundation of Uruguayan constitutionalism--due to the prevalence of an all-encompassing executive branch and to the reduction of parliamentary power to an extreme minimum." Moreover, the proposal would "greatly interfere with the longstanding and untouchable judicial branch."

The constitutional tribunal would not be elected but, rather, appointed from among "important people" by the president and congress, based on the need to increase the powers of the executive branch "so that it may conduct government policy." A few weeks ago, the Christian Democratic Party published a statement rejecting the constitutional proposal at the same time that leaders of the Colorado Party criticized the principal aspects of that initiative. If we consider that the "blancos" and "colorados" together received 85 percent of the votes in the last elections held in Uruguay 9 years ago, it is easy to infer that the proposed reform is rejected by the majority of the citizenry.

According to the provisions of "Institutional Act No 2" of 1976, the reform plan must be drawn up by the 25-member State Council and subsequently submitted to a group consisting of the president, his ministers, government advisers and 28 active duty generals of the armed forces. If the proposal to establish the above collegiate body goes through, a new obstacle could arise with regard to the political opening announced by the government a few days ago and which led to the authorization of a meeting of 50 leaders of the Colorado Party aimed at initiating the party's internal reorganization.

More than once we have given credit where credit is due to the current Uruguayan leaders for firmly repelling extremist activity and with equal resolution confronting the guerrillas, who constitute one of the most powerful and well-trained subversive organizations in Latin America. For that same reason, we are assuming that their new measures will be within the scope of political efforts aimed at safeguarding the essential powers of the democratic institutions. The concept of establishing superstate organizations with the function of controlling or watching over the constitutional exercise of public administration is not compatible with the requirements of the political evolution now underway.

8568
CSO: 3010

COMMUNISTS TO REORIENT LABOR-RELATED ACTIVITIES

Buenos Aires CONVICCION in Spanish 31 Jul 80 p 10

[Text] The fact that Athos Fava has become secretary general of the Argentine Communist Party [PCA] signals the arrival of a veteran union leader to the decisionmaking ranks of that political organization. This event, far from being fortuitous, is apparently in keeping with a bolder strategy of intervention in the current phase.

An event which would endorse this orientation would be the failure to promote the other strong candidate, Oscar Arevalo, who had cleared a significant path for himself in that party by residing in Europe for several years as an official of the CPSU.

When Arevalo returned to Argentina and was chosen by the 12th Communist Party Congress held in May 1963 to conduct a new "cadre school" for the organization, many of his peers did not know about his achievements; that factor weighed heavily in the election finally held.

However, according to some observers of the course being taken by the Argentine party, Fava's appointment is also in keeping with the need to intervene more forcefully in the Argentine labor movement.

As Fava pointed out in a brief article which appeared in the REVISTA INTERNACIONAL, "what is in a state of crisis in our country is not the need for a union or a vanguard party, the PCA, but the fact that an ideology, certain methods and nonproletarian ideas have been imposed for many years to lead the labor movement toward passivity and defeat."

Fava's ideas on trade unionism are explained in the same article, in which he also criticizes the right as well as the extreme left. "The Peronist right is trying to carry out the same role as that of European social democracy, with its own interpretation in keeping with its nationalist roots, impregnating it with middle-class nationalist ideology. However, both the old paths of reformism and middle-class nationalism, as experience shows, serve only to divide and demobilize the working class and the popular movement.

"In turn," Fava continues in the REVISTA INTERNACIONAL article, "the extreme left has shown itself to be no more than the expression of lower middle-class adventurism, and its leaders often come from the extreme right."

An Agreement

After expressing his opinion on these sectors of the political spectrum, Fava indicates that he is not in disagreement with Peronism, with which he believes it is possible to work in unison without removing its adherents from their union responsibilities.

"This does not mean," he asserts, "replacing the Peronist leaders with communists but, rather, establishing by joint agreement, from top to bottom, a unified and coherent directorate which will reflect the spirit of struggle and desires of the workers."

Fava then stresses that, with his party's leadership, "the masses will learn. The masses will learn more quickly if the PCA is at their side."

According to the new secretary general of that organization, the PCA is increasing the number of its members among the working class. "A study of the class composition of those who have joined the party in the last few years shows that about 70 percent are wage earners and that 50 percent of that group are workers."

Fava stresses that these figures "make it clear that our main concern is in building and strengthening the party in the large firm where, together with the Peronist workers, we are experiencing very difficult and complicated situations."

Fava's study does not refer to Argentina's current political situation nor to his opinion of the current government but concludes with the observation that "the PCA is at this stage the principal link which can determine the course of events, and its ability to do so will become greater as the party grows."

8568

CSO: 3010

ARGENTINA

PERONISM SEEN AS CAUSE OF INSTABILITY

Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 22 Aug 80 p 10

[Article by Jose Antonio Abuin: "Our Chronic Instability"]

[Text] More than 4 years have passed since the day when the armed forces decided to take over the government political posts. For the sixth time in less than half a century, the military bases and barracks opened their doors to allow the armed branch of the country to become its leading head as well.

This last assignment of functions has been deemed by some to be the cause and others the effect of the chronic instability from which we have suffered in the last half-century.

What is beyond question is that the most outstanding characteristic of this half-century has been this instability. Between 1930 and 1980 there should have been nine presidents of the republic. Instead there were 22, 13 of them provided by the army. There have been six military pronouncements and eight presidential elections. The only presidents whose authority derived from the polls and who succeeded in finishing their terms were two generals--Justo and Peron, although the latter was expelled in the midst of his second term and died in the course of the first year of his third. This serious political instability led to profound instability in all other sectors.

It can be asserted that neither the polls nor the barracks have provided us, except with an occasional honorable exception, with leaders who were equal to the needs and above all the urgent problems of the era. On the contrary, this period has been outstanding in that decisive action was taken by the worst of the examples the land of the Argentines has produced to date. I am speaking, obviously, of Peron.

It was precisely the fact that the seriousness of the subversion to which Peronism led was not understood in its full magnitude that allowed the demagogues to profit from this sea of confusion, while many of the others were not and are not successfully taking the proper steps which, in a

country subject to subversion, cannot be simply administrative. In other words, one does not triumph over subversion by building a bridge, a road, or even a nuclear plant.

Peronism did not govern nor fail to govern. Its followers branded its adversaries as unpatriotic, sold out to imperialism, servants of the multinational enterprises and slaves of "international synarchy." But it was they who invaded the country and treated it like a conquered land, through the introduction of the theory and the practice of two highly subversive doctrines: first Nazi-Fascism and then communism.

These doctrines are entirely foreign to our traditions, and therefore it is pertinent to state that Peronism is entirely antinational. The whole truth is not being told, therefore, when it is said that Peronism governed badly, or even when it is said that its government was the very worst. Those who remain thus superficial reveal that they do not want to understand that Peronism, because of having pursued this intensive and extensive task of subverting the beliefs and ideas, the institutions and the life of the republic, succeeded in reestablishing anti-Argentina. It had been defeated in Mayo and in Caseros, but it surged up again, as there can be no doubt.

Peronism has always been a synonym of chaos. Under these conditions, it is more than clear that it could not govern. When Peron and his accomplices were swept out of power during the memorable days of September 1955, the country seemed to be awakening from a bad dream and it hastened jubilantly to stanch the wounds resulting from the total war Peronism had waged against its opponents, and to embark upon the path of recovery. But the evil had not been conquered, as became very clear and evident shortly thereafter.

Peron profoundly divided society and society has continued to be divided since then. This explains why it has not been possible to govern, for there is no government without society.

This, which is so basic, was not even understood by those who followed in the government of the country after 1958, that is to say for more than 20 years now. All had their plans and programs but none succeeded in carrying them out. For some this was because they compromised with Peronism and believed that they could govern thus, whereas Peronism is constitutionally incapable of making the existence of order possible, and without this, it is obvious that there can be no government. In other cases, it was because they did not or would not realize that, before even attempting to implement any program, it was absolutely indispensable to dump the ballast of Peronism, which was causing the ship to list and making it impossible to navigate.

This situation also explains why the political career of Peron was so long. It was not simply that he could win many more votes than others, for he also talked a different language and wanted things other than his

antagonists did. While Peron devoted himself, constantly and in the broad light of day--for it must be admitted that he was brilliantly clear and only those who wanted to be were deceived--to the establishment of a totalitarian regime in the country, this undertaking cannot be imputed to any of the other de jure or de facto presidents, although a couple of them flirted with Marxism. We are excluding, naturally, Campora and Lastiri. But they lacked personality, and were merely agents of Peron.

The electoral process which led to the elections of March and September 1973 was a clear example. The Peronists won and what inevitably had to happen happened--the country lost. Had any of the other parties won, Peronism would not have allowed it to govern. The conclusion is that this process should not have been sponsored without first resolving the Peronist issue.

How? By revealing it for what it was. By making it clear that the Peronist doctrine is anti-Argentine. That the party was not a civic association, but a band for plundering the country. That its leaders, with their leader as their head, were with an occasional exception the very worst which could be found in any one of the sectors of the country. And that finally, it brought chaos, violence, corruption, and that it wanted to produce nothing else.

The task of enlightenment fell short in extent and the depth needed, as is revealed by the fact that so many young people believed, above all at the beginning of the present decade, that Peron could provide a solution to our evils. Precisely he who had created them.

On the other hand, if after carrying out this campaign of clarification, after having made all the necessary efforts to reeducate the Peronists, there still remained an irreducible nucleus, it is obvious that this sector could not claim any right to impose a totalitarian model on the country. The matter is the clearer if we note that, even if a majority were to propose such a thing, that majority would have to be contained to make it impossible for it to advance, thus committing real suicide for itself and for the true citizens.

Now then, Peronism continues to exist in the minds and the hearts of many people. In the projects it carried out and which have not been dismantled, and in its hopes for return. And there are many who continue to pursue the same old policy which brought so many evils to the country. For some it is because they still do not understand this reality and admit this presence, as if thereby the recovery of the republic were possible. And others, although admitting it, hope to profit from it in the coming elections, which they would like to have held as soon as possible.

The analysis of what has been done in these past 4 years should be focused mainly on this question. For it is a visceral issue and that which explains the existence of other problems. On the other hand, if attention is focused on the surface level, action in the wrong direction will continue. It is

not the symptoms which should be examined, but the subversion provoked by Peronism. Until this is faced as it should be, it will be futile to try to patch up the consequences.

The mentality and the projects which represent the heritage of Peronism have prevented us from being able to emerge from decadence and build a modern country. Despite the efforts which have been made in other sectors, since the basic question has not been addressed, we have been converted into a country whose image reflects chaos and pettiness. It is this which has made possible the rude and even aggressive treatment we have received abroad.

Instead of presuming that all of this criticism is unjust and spending a great deal of money in an "attempt to reveal our true image," let us recognize that for many years we have been a people who have given rise to some leaders specializing in creating rather than resolving problems. Therefore, if indeed we have had and continue to have foreign enemies, the most numerous and fearful ones have emerged from within our society.

All of these leaders are clearly individualized. They have pursued their path and produced their works. We should feel no guilt of conscience if we eliminate them definitively from public life, for they have had their opportunity to act and they have done so, doing serious harm to the country. It is wrong to give them further opportunities.

If this is not done now, if those who worked against the country are allowed to participate in a future electoral contest, the evils in our country cannot be corrected. For the mechanism which has several times succeeded in converting the majority of our citizens into a mere flock of electoral sheep, making them believe that the important thing is that the succession of elections not be interrupted, will be put to use again.

It must be remembered that in 1976 elections were scheduled for the end of that year and that many politicians "gave assurance" that they could find the solutions to the evils plaguing the country therein. And so the regime became an electoral regime with no substance or goals other than to keep the electoral wheel turning, such that the image of the professional politician swelled to the point of covering the entire horizon. And then, inevitably, the citizen sinks to the status of a pawn of the political boss.

Since the electoral system is characterized by the effort to satisfy the greed of the voters for profit rather than the civic aspirations of the citizens, the leaders willing to function in an atmosphere so devoid of proper ethics can only be, barring some isolated exceptions, mediocre politicians seeking to achieve a constant leveling downward in order to conceal their shortcomings of all sorts. A system like this can only lead to destruction of the hierarchy, apathy, lack of discipline, chaos and decadence.

There has repeatedly been recourse to the procedure of separating professional politicians from the administration and even the discussion of public affairs. But this has not resolved the problems, because after a certain time the whole of the banned list has returned to action, which was possible because the necessary housecleaning and organization measures were not adopted.

In order to dismantle the electoral politicking system, one must begin by distorting the formula according to which "anyone can elect anyone." This is not to urge selection of the voters, but rather selection of the candidates. It simply means recalling the existence of Article 16 of the constitution. Nor would it be a bad idea for us to remember that the constitution is based on the republican system. Let us then educate the leaders and the citizens so that we can recover an effective republic. It is not as is clear a matter of "dialog" with anyone, but of proceeding along the path pointed out to us very clearly by the highest law.

Let us summarize. We must attack the causes and not simply the outer manifestations of our problems. If we do not do this now, we will be allowing another electoral process to establish in power those who will profit from the continued existence of a situation which has led us, through chaos and inefficiency, to decadence.

An assessment of what has been done and what could not be done or was not wanted in these last 4 years shows that we owe our difficulties to the Peronist legacy, which has become unmanageable and intolerable. We must rid ourselves of it to allow our society to reorganize. Otherwise, we will continue to suffer from the chronic instability which has done us so much damage.

5157

CSO: 3010

ARGENTINA

PALADINO SEEKS DEMOCRATIZATION OF JUSTICIALIST PARTY

Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 22 Aug 80 p 10

[Text] Mar del Plata (NA)--Jorge Paladino, formerly the personal representative of Juan Peron, has demanded the "democratization" of the Justicialist Party because he believes that this will be "a way also of contributing to the democratization of the country."

He added that "the country needs organized, orderly and disciplined but not submissive Justicialism" in order to prevent "an effort to lull or domesticate it, because politics is dynamic."

In this connection, he also urged the government "to speak clearly about this process of democratization, so that it will not be postponed indefinitely."

Paladino visited this city to appear on a television program in which he talked with journalists.

He stressed also that he still supports his "old ideas," because now "more than ever it is necessary to put them in practice," and he went on to differentiate two eras in Peronism: "that of the living Peron, and that since his death."

Democratization

"Thus I demand the democratization of my party," he said, "and the emergence of leaders, be they those now or different ones, for the democratization of Justicialism."

He came out in favor of "frank and honest dialog" but he disparaged the present discussion because he believes that dialog "must be based on honesty, on the intention to debate with the political parties, with those who can truly achieve the possibility of governing the country."

He said that "democracy is the best way of governing" and expressed the view that "the parties are the tools."

With regard to the participation of one Peronist sector in a meeting with the minister of interior, he said that he did not want to express any view "as to whether Raul Matera did well or badly in participating in the talks," but he said that "dialog should be something else, through the officials of the established parties."

As to his being invited to participate, he said that "there has recently been speculation as to whether I, in this particular case, would accept or not, but in fact they have not offered, and I want to be very honest about this."

Extremists

On the subject of the "special groups" of Peronists to which Angel Robledo recently referred and the presumed support by Peron of those responsible for the kidnaping and murder of former President Pedro Aramburu, he recalled that on that occasion "I held a press conference as Peron's representative and on his behalf, repudiated the crime."

He added that he continued for 2 more years to represent him and that "I was never dismissed."

With regard to the letter in which Peron appears to endorse the Montoneros, he said: "Well, it must be realized that the intelligence services specialized in drafting presumed letters, messages, records and other similar things by Peron."

In conclusion, Paladino maintained that "to speak the truth, one must examine how the Montoneros were organized, and the source and motivations of Palermo and the gentlemen who supported them."

3157

CSO: 3010

BARBADOS

BRIEFS

HIGH COMMISSIONER FROM NEW ZEALAND--New Zealand's high commissioner to Barbados, Mr Edward Latter, will present his letter of introduction to Prime Minister Mr Tom Adams, today at 3:30 p.m. at government headquarters, Bay Street. [Excerpt] [FL112340 Bridgetown ADVOCATE-NEWS in English 8 Sep 80 p 1]

CSO: 3020

CHILE

ECONOMIC GROWTH FOR 1980 SET AT 5 PERCENT

Santiago TERCERA DE LA HORA in Spanish 21 Aug 80 p 10

[Text] Economists Mario Gomez, Andres Sanfuentes and Andres Passicot--the latter two are professors on the faculty of the University of Chile--agreed yesterday that national economic growth will be one-third less than originally estimated; in other words, it will not exceed 5 percent during 1980.

The professor and former head of the University's Department of Economics went even further in stating that "there is no possibility whatever" that the economy will exceed this annual growth rate over the next 3 years.

At the start of 1980, various authorities in the government and in the private sector had estimated a growth rate of 8-8.5 percent for the country's activities as a whole, with expectations "in some sectors reaching as high as 15 percent," it was admitted Tuesday of this week by the president of the SOFOFA [Industrial Development Association], Hernan Daroch.

The SOFOFA subsequently reduced its expectancy to around 6 percent. This figure has now been further reduced to 5 percent.

Andres Passicot, Mario Gomez and Andres Sanfuentes commented separately on the economy's momentum and on the related near-term forecasts, in a seminar held by the "Gemines" research firm.

Passicot said that the economic growth of the industrial, agricultural and mining sectors will be less this year than his estimated general average of 5 percent. Furthermore, the mining sector's growth will be less than 2 percent, owing mainly to lowered production of copper and coal, which will be only partially offset by higher production of oil and potassium nitrate.

The lowered growth rate in the agricultural sector, with respect to the original estimate is owing, in Passicot's opinion, to the climatic difficulties confronting this sector. It will be recalled that production and yields in 8 of the 14 traditional crops had already dropped as early as during the 1979-1980 growing season.

The economist did not go into explanatory detail regarding industry's growth drop. However, the SOFOFA's president said this week that this sector "is reaching a market saturation level" in Chile and that industries are experiencing quite some difficulty in "acquiring more consumers."

Hernan Daroch declined to identify this phenomenon as an outright recession, preferring to call it a "situation of slower growth than expected."

In contrast to the situation outlined for industry, agriculture and mining, Andres Passicot stated that the construction and services sectors--specifically transportation and trade--will experience growth rates surpassing 5 percent this year.

According to Passicot, this reduced economic growth rate for the country as a whole is explained by the fact that "the recovery in terms of real wages has about reached its termination, and real wages will now increase by (only) 7 percent annually, which is just about right," in his view.

Another factor entering into this phenomenon is that "domestic prices seem to have risen more than was expected," with the result that many domestically manufactured products "were substituted by (other similar) imported ones."

Economist Andres Sanfuentes, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that the reduced overall growth rate has as its principal cause a "light creative investment level." He explained that over the last few years investors have already gone into those sectors where "it was obvious to do so" in view of the profits and comparative advantages they offered.

Economist Mario Gomez said he concurred in the views expressed by Passicot and added that in some industrial branches--such as textiles--a precipitous drop in growth rate is observable.

9399

CSO: 3010

CHILE

COUNTRY SEEN AS IN POSITION TO PRODUCE SYNTHETIC OIL

Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 20 Aug 80 pp 1, A-20

[Text] Chile is in a position to produce synthetic oil from mined coal. The oil could replace crude in all its uses, including those of the petrochemicals industry.

This statement was made by the director of the Department of Chemical Technology of the College of Physical and Mathematical sciences, University of Chile, Alvaro Gonzalez, who deems that coal in the near future will again be the planet's most important energy source, owing to the exhaustion of its oil reserves.

The scientist announced yesterday the first high-level seminar on new coal technologies to be held in this country. It will take place tomorrow and Friday in this city's Hotel Carrera.

Professors from Notre Dame University in the United States and from the Imperial College of the University of London will take part in the proceedings, in addition to researchers from the University of Chile.

Oil From Coal

"One of the most interesting prospects that is opening up for the use of coal," said Gonzalez, "is its conversion to a hydrocarbon fluid similar to petroleum, which can be substituted for the latter in all its applications."

"Success has even been had with the production of gasolines with ratings in excess of 100 octanes, which, when mixed with other easily obtainable products, yield gasolines of special or ordinary kinds that can be used in common automobiles," he said.

Costs

Ricardo Badilla, doctor of chemical engineering and author of the "coal liquefaction" project, said, for his part, that "the technology is already available in many countries, but the problems are economic ones."

He explained that, at present coal prices and using technologies now in operation, the cost of producing a petroleum equivalent from coal is around \$50 per barrel. "Since the current price of petroleum is between \$30 and \$35 a barrel," he said, "and it is expected to continue rising, we can say that when oil reaches \$50 a barrel coal will be competitive."

He added, however, that "further technological developments will bring about a gradual reduction of production costs below the present figures."

"Moreover," he pointed out, "in Chile we are very close to commercial exploitation of the Magallanes coal deposits, which, since it will be opencut mining, will provide coal at a price well below the international price and will therefore bring the cost of producing synthetic oil down to around \$35 a barrel."

Research

By way of example, they indicated that in the United States it has been calculated that to construct a plant for converting coal to oil at a rate of 500,000 barrels a day (five times Chile's entire daily consumption) requires an investment of around \$1 billion.

"Nevertheless," said Badilla, "any such estimate applicable to the United States, England or other countries is not applicable to Chile, because of the fact that our coals are of a different and unique composition."

"Before any decision of an economic nature can be arrived at," he said, "we must know exactly the behavior of our coals, and this research effort is therefore necessary."

9399

CSO: 3010

GOVERNMENT CRITICIZED FOR METHOD OF ENDING STRIKE

Too Many Contradictions

San Jose LA NACION in Spanish 1 Sep 80 p 14A

[Passages enclosed in alantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Analysis of the documents produced as a result of the Pacifico Sur strike and the settlement of that dispute, ranging from Decree 11748-TSS (which permitted intervention in the company) to the statement made to the nation by the minister of labor the afternoon of last 29 August on radio and television networks, **confirms the already widespread impression that the Carazo Odio Administration resorts all too frequently to a curious and disturbing trick to make certain actions appear to be its own. Unfortunately, the facts do not support such an interpretation.**

In the case of the Pacifico Sur strike, as in others before it, this government duality has been repeated amazingly often, resulting in a credibility gap between what the government tells the nation and what it does. Invariably the government begins with the premise that if the facts contradict its words, too bad for the facts. When the Pacifico Sur strike was already over a month old, the government issued a decree on 13 August taking over control of the company's activities and the supervision of its labor relations, for the purpose of ensuring the continuation of work and services, as well as guaranteeing the workers' freedom to have their jobs back if they so desired. Although that government measure received support--sometimes enthusiastic--from the managerial sectors of the country; and although the decree was responding legally and politically to the need to resolve a situation that was going on too long, given the circumstances, the decree nevertheless was too ambitious. It did not confine itself to the objectives established by legal and constitutional norms, but tried to solve the whole problem and end the strike with the stroke of a pen.

For that purpose it created two commissions, a tripartite one which was to look into the firing of workers, and a technical one which was to make a decision on wage adjustments. The decree also set forth the criterion that there would be no reprisal "nor would penal, civil or company disciplinary action be taken against the workers, labor organizations or their leaders

for merely having participated in the strike movement." It asserted that "the above-mentioned control does not imply financial or commercial intervention, nor interference in the company's general management." The contradiction between this assertion and the establishment of a Technical Commission made up of an official from the Ministry of labor, two representatives of the National Banana Association and two from the National Banana Growers Chamber, which was to make a decision on which wages "were to be adjusted and by how much," was overcome by the alleged acceptance of the commission by the company in question.

However, the strike did not end with the issuance of the decree. During the days that followed the problem of violence emerged. The possibility that the parties would resume negotiations under the new conditions created by government control was dashed by the decree itself when it out and out prescribed the procedure that had to be followed to resolve the labor disputes that had led to the strike.

The government as well as the communist leaders were facing a hopeless task due to the very text of the decree. The workers had only one choice: either submit to the terms of the decree and return to work, ending the strike, which would spell total defeat for the union leaders, or continue the strike. They chose the latter, and forced the administration to make a greater effort to enforce the guarantee of reinstatement for workers who wanted their jobs back.

It was under those circumstances that the options for a successful result for both the government and the reds became difficult. The administration faced the challenge of going ahead to impose the terms of the decree, even at the cost of possible large-scale repression. The communist leaders had no choice but sympathy strikes, and that option had already begun to fail.

That was when the negotiations took place between the administration (represented by the minister of labor) and the leaders of the Golfito Workers Union (UTG) and of the General Confederation of Workers (CGT). The government, however, true to its custom of giving deceitful explanations, did not want anyone to assume it was negotiating with the comrades, so it resorted to the ruse of interpreting the scope of the decree so that the nation would believe that it was simply a matter of talks to clear up some points that were not well understood in the decree and to determine the implications of the decree. This is where the first official version of the end to the strike comes in. The union leaders get into the picture, of course, and put forth--still in the form of an alleged clarification--six points in a letter dated 24 August, addressed to the minister of labor. In the first point they ask if the guarantees of no reprisals or legal actions also cover the workers who participated in sympathy strikes, and the people who cooperated with the movement in various ways. The second point deals with the date of the firings by the company, which they claim should be the first day of the strike, 10 April. The third point asks whether the firings will be taken care of by applying the clauses of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The fourth, regarding the firings as well, asks if they will be

resolved on faith or whether current legal norms will be applied, and if the 70 percent will be reinstated. The sixth point asks whether the Executive Branch "believes that the adjustment (of wages) could reach at least an overall figure equivalent to an amount of money no less than 12 percent of the payroll for agricultural, dock, railroad, engineering, and factory workers, as well as other similar workers." We have omitted the fifth point because it simply asks if the Technical Commission will hear the workers.

The curious thing is, all these points were made by union leaders "ad inquerendum," that is, asking if they could expect their demands to be met in accordance with the scope of the decree.

The minister's answer to these "concerns" was not long in coming. On the same day, 24 August, he answers their questions in the following manner: 1) The government will take the necessary action to prevent reprisals or legal actions against the workers who participated in the sympathy strikes, or against those who cooperated with these movements. That is, the government is taking on that commitment outside the context of the decree, but leading people to believe that this is one of its "implications," that third parties will be protected (that is, communist leaders not affiliated with the union); no reprisals or legal actions will be taken against these people. The government, then, is promising to renege on its public service duty, as set forth in Article 334 of the Penal Code.. The government is entering into a pact, therefore, at the cost of the legal order.

2) The time limit for the firings is between 6 April 1979 and 10 April 1980. Thus it deals with the "concern" of the comrades. 3) The dismissal cases will also be subject to the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 4) The firings will be resolved in accordance with the justice that prevails in each case, and /We can assert/, according to the judgment of the officials who have made the corresponding initial study, /that approximately 70 percent/ of them can be reinstated." 5) "/We can assure you/ that this adjustment made by the Technical Commission will have the overall result of an increase the equivalent of /12 percent/ of the average wage of the workers you mention in your letter, working from the average wages paid during the first half of this year."

According to the above-mentioned terms, the minister of labor agreed to the "clarifications" of the strike leaders, and according to those very terms those leaders defused the movement and ordered the workers to return to their jobs, proclaiming at the same time a resounding victory.

The reaction, first by the company (which was not even heard at the negotiations) and then by the Chambers (which several days earlier had ventured to express firm support for the administration and the decree), to this settlement, as well as the surprise evoked among other sectors of public opinion and the mass media, obliged the government to back-pedal. Its insistence that there would never be any departure from the terms of the decree, on which its prestige depended, led the minister of labor to engage

in a difficult and elaborate dialectical acrobatic exercise to demonstrate the indemonstrable, that the entire agreement with the comrades was nothing less than the result of the literal application of the decree. He said there was no negotiation of any kind, and that the leaders had ended the strike when they finally understood the provisions clearly.

In view of the objections put forth by the company (which did not accept the settlement), and the criticism by the press, the Chambers and the private sector, the administration is trying out a second version of the facts. Naturally, it was presented to us by the minister of labor, who is the one who has to walk the tightrope and who knows the most about the pact with the union leaders. The settlement was not simply a clarification of the decree, but something substantial enough to cause them to defuse the strike movement.

In this second version, the minister of labor sacrifices the workers, making the promises of his letter of 24 August to the union leaders appear to be mere opinions of his, without any significant value. First he tried to surprise the company and public opinion by asserting that there was no negotiation and that the talks dealt with the scope of the decree. But once the concessions made to the strike leaders became known, he cast the latter adrift and left them floating, maintaining that nothing had been agreed upon. In his answer of 24 August the minister says, regarding the two basic points of the conflict (the dismissals and wages): "/We could also assert/ according to the opinion of the officials who made the corresponding initial study, that approximately 70 percent of them can be reinstated." That is, the minister assures the union leaders, so that they will end the strike, that "approximately 70 percent of the workers will be reinstated." How can the minister make that promise if that point has to be decided "in toto," by the Tripartite Commission? But now, in the second version, that is omitted and the minister says in his 29 August message: "It is the /opinion/ of the Ministry of Labor that approximately 70 percent of the fired people can be reinstated. But we do not really know how many workers will be reinstated until the Tripartite Commission, established in accordance with the stipulations of the executive decree and accepted by the banana company, hands down its decision; then we will be able to know the exact percentage of workers who will get their jobs back." Does this bear any relation to what he told the strike leaders? Why didn't the minister give them that answer instead of the one he gave on 24 August, in which he doesn't express his opinion, but assures the comrades that approximately 70 percent of the fired workers will be reinstated? Is it possible that a matter as touchy as this one can be handled with such inexplicable ambiguity by an official and an entire administration?

In the letter to the strike leaders written 24 August he promises the following with regard to wages: "/We can assure/ you that that adjustment, to be made by the Technical Commission, /will achieve/ an overall result of 12 percent of the average wages. . ." This is a formal promise, sealed with his signature, and led the union leaders to call off the strike. But on 29 August, the minister changed his mind. He told us that on that point

"I took the liberty of expressing the opinion that 12 percent of the overall amount of the payroll could be the percentage of the final adjustment for the workers." On the 24th he said "we can assure you that that adjustment, to be made by the Technical Commission, will achieve an overall result of 12 percent. . ." and 5 days later, on the 29th, he explained that he only "took the liberty" of expressing an opinion, but that it would be the Commission's decision. Now it is not the company, but the workers who have been left up in the air, unless it is contrived that the Tripartite Commission will set at 60 or 70 percent the number of workers who are to be reinstated, and that the Technical Commission will decide that the overall raises will amount to 12 percent.

Under those conditions, no one can be certain: not the nation, not the companies, not the unions. If the government proceeds like this, no one knows what to go by or what words mean. The uncertainty created by these actions and the administration's obstinate adherence to the idea that the decree was implemented and there were no negotiations, contrary to what is shown by official documents themselves and the facts, is surely creating a climate of anxiety and concern in the country. This trend must be stopped by means of a drastic rectification and sudden awakening to the true situation in this country.

Minister of Labor Criticized

San Jose LA REPUBLICA in Spanish 31 Aug 80 p 6

[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The official handling of the banana strike completely exhausted the Costa Rican people's ability to be astounded. Now, perplexed, we are wondering whom the government is trying to fool. The democratic sector? Management? The banana workers? The communist leaders? Itself?

Things are in bad straits when the minister of labor feels it necessary to constantly clarify the clarifications he makes of the executive decree issued 13 August, supposedly to put an end to the banana strike in the south. However, the more he explains, the more he gets caught up in the tangle of contradictions that he has woven. There is no other possible result in situations in which what one says and what one does have nothing to do with each other.

Not even the least dialectical effort is needed to discover the trap into which the minister of labor placed the administration by trying to introduce some citizen sector whose identity is becoming more and more confusing. Here lies a danger whose consequences, God willing, we will not have to lament for too much longer.

In a new twist in his ever-changing position, the minister said in the speech he gave on national radio and television networks last Friday:

"For the first time in Costa Rican history an illegal strike, in this case led by extremist leaders, has ended with the latter accepting the juridical system, without negotiations, through the implementation of the executive decree issued for the purpose of ending the strike."

We are given to understand that the juridical system referred to by the minister is the one made up by all current legal norms, including the executive decree issued on 13 August. The decree was welcomed warmly by the citizens, because they saw reflected in it a firm and decisive position by the government regarding the illegal action of the communist leaders; not because they were convinced of the constitutional and legal purity of that executive action. Let us analyze, with the simplicity characteristic of the case, the manner in which the minister has tried to tell each sector what he thought that sector should hear, either fooling everyone or outwitting himself into believing that he could manipulate them without anyone's discovering that he was acting without direction or judgment.

/The executive decree of 13 August (Article 3) says:/

"The workers shall return to their jobs at 0500 hours on 14 August of this year, with an absolute guarantee of the continuation of their labor contracts and the absence of reprisals or penal, civil or disciplinary actions /against the workers, labor organizations and their leaders/ for merely having participated in the strike movement."

The guarantee granted by the decree is clearly and specifically limited to the banana workers, to the labor organizations that participated in the strike and their leaders; no one else. /In a letter sent to the minister 24 August, the communists bargain:/

"Does that guarantee extend to the fellow workers who have participated in the resulting sympathy strikes, /and to the people who cooperated with our movement in various ways?/"

The communists' request goes beyond the limits of the decree to include within the guarantees offered in that document, red agitators who do not belong to the company or the unions, who went to the area to disturb the peace and to encourage the violation of the law.

/First explanation by the minister, 24 August:/

"By the same token, the government will make the necessary efforts to ensure that the same conduct will apply to those who participated in sympathy strikes, as long as said strikes are called off as a consequence of /this response: or against those who lent support to these movements./"

The minister hastened to give in to the demands of the communists who were on the fringes of the law; not only did he extend the guarantees offered by the decree to those who went to sympathy strikes, but he also made them apply to third parties, agitators and activists who had nothing to do with

the movement. That leaves company doors wide open to strangers who come trying to promote illegal movements. Furthermore, he stipulates a condition for the expansion of the guarantee: that the sympathy strikes be called off as a consequence /of his response/, and not, as he says now, in accordance with the executive decree's provisions.

/Second explanation by the minister, 27 August:/

"The judicial actions that for punitive reasons were filed with the courts by the office of the attorney general of the republic, an office of the Ministry of Justice, shall continue forward. Whether they be workers or third parties, the people who committed crimes shall answer for them; /there shall be no future legal actions before the penal courts. . ✓"

The minister, a distinguished lawyer, knows full well that the law dictates that crimes be prosecuted, and that this duty is irrevocable. Therefore, his offer is illegal. He also knows that the trials already begun in the restrictive courts can only end in dismissals of the cases, whether the verdict be a conviction or an acquittal, without the Executive Branch being able to do anything to modify that procedure. Thus, there is nothing behind his assertion that criminal prosecutions will continue forward.

/Third explanation by the minister, 29 August:/

". . . does not mean that the people who committed crimes shall remain unpunished; those cases shall be heard by the courts /and were not dismissed/ Of course /new cases will not be filed/ as a result of the strike because as soon as the strike ends, no new case can exist for the very reason that there is no strike."

Neither the president of the republic nor the minister or anyone else can drop criminal charges already filed; but what is most serious is not the sophism of saying that what cannot be done was not done, but the announcement that the law requiring prosecution will be ignored if there emerges evidence now of crimes committed during the strike, which to date have not resulted in the filing of charges.

/The executive decree of 13 August (Article 5) says:/

"A technical commission, coordinated by an official of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and made up also of two representatives of the National Banana Association and of the National Banana Growers Chamber, /shall determine which rates,/ beyond the parameters established of 20 percent of wage incentives per unit of time accrued by the workers of the Compania Bananera de Costa Rica, /shall be adjusted, and by how much. . ✓"

The decree gives the Technical Commission exclusive authority to determine the rates and the amounts of wage adjustments, "beyond the parameters established of 20 percent of wage incentives." /In the letter sent to the minister by the communists on 24 August, the latter bargain:/

"Does the Executive Branch believe that this adjustment could reach at least an overall figure equivalent to a sum of money not less than 12 percent of the payroll of agricultural, dock, railroad, engineering and factory workers, as well as others?"

/First explanation by the minister, 24 August:/

"/We can assure/ you that that adjustment, to be made by the Technical Commission, will achieve an overall result of an increase equivalent to 12 percent of the average wages of the workers you mention in your letter, working from the average wages paid during the first half of this year."

In the negotiations, the minister hastened to answer the communists on 24 August that they were in an illegal position. He clearly, decisively and expressly told them that "/we can assert,/" without hesitation or doubt, that "that adjustment /to be made/ by the Technical Commission will achieve" "an increase equivalent to 12 percent."

That offer is direct, clear and precise, and it violates the executive decree as well as the legal norms the decree supposedly was based on.

/Second explanation by the minister, 27 August:/

"It is the opinion of the Executive Branch that that adjustment could be equivalent to 12 percent of the average wages of the workers, /and that was what it informed/ the social organizations that represent them. But the Technical Commission shall carry out its task with the knowledge and approval of the employing company, and have the final word on this issue."

It is impossible to understand the dialectical juggling of the minister, because what he told the communists was quite different. In an official note, on behalf of the administration, he told them, "/We can assure you/" that the adjustment to be made by the Technical Commission "/will achieve an overall result of an increase equivalent to 12 percent./"

/Third explanation by the minister, 29 August:/

"/I took the liberty of expressing the opinion/ that 12 percent of the overall amount of the payroll could be the percentage of the final adjustment for the workers. /It does not necessarily/ have to be that percentage."

Whom is the minister trying to fool or confuse? In his answer to the communists on 24 August, /he assured them/ that they will have an overall increase of 12 percent. Now, at the end, he says that he "took the liberty of expressing the opinion" and that "they will not necessarily get the 12 percent raise they demanded."

The problem is that the communists called off the strike because the minister /assured them/ that the Technical Commission would grant them that

raise, and not in accordance with the executive decree of 13 August, as the official claims now. The reds were clear in the note they sent on 25 August:

"In accordance with your answer/ contained in communication DM-846-80, we have prepared to call upon the striking workers to go back to their jobs at the Compania Bananera de Costa Rica and call off the sympathy strikes supporting them, as established in our earlier letter."

That is, the strike was ended because the minister told the communists: "We can assure you . . . that that adjustment, to be made by the Technical Commission, will achieve an overall result of an increase equivalent to 12 percent." Is the minister now trying to fool the communists by taking away what he so emphatically guaranteed them?

/Executive decree of 13 August:/

That decree established a Tripartite Commission to study separately each dismissal that took place after 6 April 1979, and to determine, case by case, which workers should be reinstated in their jobs.

/Request by communists in 24 August letter:/

"We want to know. . . and if the previous study made by the ministry of the different cases allows you to assure us that at least 70 percent of the fired workers could return to their jobs."

/First explanation by the minister, 24 August:/

"By the same token, /we can assert,/ according to the opinion of officials who made the corresponding initial study, that approximately 70 percent of them can be reinstated."

The minister says nothing here about the results that could be obtained by the Tripartite Commission in its study of the cases; on the contrary, it makes an assertion that gives the impression that it is binding upon the above-mentioned Commission.

/Second explanation by the minister, 27 August:/

". . . but it will not be until there has been a definitive decision that the exact percentage of reinstated workers can be revealed."

In this second explanation of the modification of the decree, in an interpretive manner, the minister begins to modify what he affirmed to the communist leaders, and points out that the number of workers to be reinstated depends on the decision of the Tripartite Commission. He does it timidly, however, indicating that only then will "the exact percentage" be known, since in his letter regarding the negotiated settlement of the strike he assured them that "approximately" 70 percent would get their jobs back.

/Third explanation by the minister, 29 August:/

"The Ministry of labor has expressed the opinion that approximately 70 percent of the fired workers /could be/ reinstated."

That was not what he told the communists when he negotiated with those who were behaving illegally, to end the strike. He told them, "We can assert. . . that approximately 70 percent of them can be reinstated."

That same day, 29 August, he cleared up that point further by saying: "But we will not really know how many workers will be reinstated until the Tripartite Commission, established in accordance with the stipulations of the executive decree and accepted by the banana company, hands down its decision."

This indicates that if the Tripartite Commission says that no worker shall be reinstated, then why did he tell the communists he could assure them that 70 percent would be reinstated, according to the preliminary studies he had in his possession?

If after swearing up and down that the Executive Branch would not negotiate with those who adhered to an illegal position, and that he would enforce the 13 August decree, he negotiated with the red leaders on the pretext of explanations and the determination of the decree's scope, and led them to believe that they could get a 12 percent raise for the workers and the reinstatement of 70 percent of the fired workers, then what does he expect the communists to do now that they have been deceived, especially if the rulings by the commissions regarding wages and dismissals do not correspond to the percentages he "assured" would be granted with his authority as minister?

The minister, in this case a spokesman for the administration, should speak clearly and bring the country out of the cloud of contradictions which he has plunged it into. We Costa Ricans need to know what to expect.

Government Negotiations Criticized

San Jose LA NACION in Spanish 27 Aug 80 p 14A

[Text] By means of an agreement between the administration and the labor leaders of the General Confederation of Workers (CGT) and the Golfito Workers Union (UTG) as a result of several days of negotiating, yesterday the settlement of the Pacifico Sur strike was announced after more than 46 days of striking.

The agreement makes several concessions to the union beyond the terms of the decree with which the government took control of the company. The main concessions are an overall raise equivalent to 12 percent of the average wages, using the average wages paid during the first half of this year as a base, and a promise that the Technical Commission established by the decree to resolve this dispute shall respect this percentage; the determination of

each dismissal case in accordance with the justice of the case, with a promise that such instructions shall be given to the official representing the administration on the Tripartite Commission; and the reinstatement of at least 70 percent of the fired workers.

A peculiar aspect of this agreement to end the strike is that it was undertaken after negotiations with union leaders who advocated the illegal strike, without the participation of the representatives of the other side, that is, the Compania Bananera. Another peculiar factor is that it does not conform to the terms of the decree which, according to repeated affirmations by the administration, through its minister of labor, were irrevocable. In fact, the agreement between the government and union leaders that the wage adjustment demanded by the union "will achieve an overall result of an increase equivalent to 12 percent of the average wages" does resolve this point of conflict. The Technical Commission is entrusted only with the mechanical settlement of each case.

In this manner, the administration has made a wage agreement behind the back of the Compania Bananera, and furthermore has violated the terms of its own decree. That document said that official control "does not imply financial or commercial intervention, or interference in the general management of the company." Therefore it is not only surprising but also patently contrary to and in violation of the legal code and the collective bargaining agreements signed by the parties, for the government to announce an agreement after proclaiming over and over that there would be no negotiations with the strikers because the decree provided a means to end the movement. One of the parties involved was not even heard, and the agreement violates current labor legislation, as well as the very text of the decree which permitted government intervention in the company.

What the government began well, it finished badly. We do not know what drastic circumstances led the government to negotiate under the table with the leaders of the CGT and the UTG, when many workers were already beginning to go back to work and a demonstration of police force lent credence to its decision to enforce a decree that provided a mechanism apparently agreeable to the Compania Bananera to resolve the basic points of conflict.

The Compania Bananera, however, made it clear to the government that it does not accept the agreement made with the union leaders who were responsible for the strike. It has said that if the government forces it to accept the settlement, it will take the matter to court so that the courts will have the final say. If they win such a suit, which is very likely given the legal aspects of the case, the state would have to pay a large indemnity, something the present administration would certainly not have to face. Meanwhile, the union leaders are proclaiming a resounding victory, and are preparing to celebrate with a parade next Thursday. No one has forgotten, however, that the strike continues in La Estrella and Rio Frio, and that those strikers will receive full support from the victorious workers of Pacifico Sur.

The result of the conflict, then, if the strike is indeed over, could not be worse. Not only have the comrades attained an apparent victory, reflected in a 12 percent raise (which is not serious in and of itself), but the victory has been obtained behind the back of the law and in defiance of the government's own promises to obey the text of the decree. It was made possible by direct negotiations between the administration and the strike leaders, without consulting the company. The country should be very alarmed at the precedent this sets.

The divorce between word and deed that has characterized this administration (which in the case in question became patently obvious when until a few hours ago Minister Serrano Pinto was claiming repeatedly that the talks with the union leaders were limited to clarification of the implications of the decree) serves to accentuate further the anxiety and uncertainty that unfortunately have invaded all Costa Ricans.

8926

CSO: 3010

BRIEFS

CIVIL AVIATION HEAD ARRESTED--The Judicial Investigation Organization [OIJ] has arrested the director of civil aviation for complicity in the drug trafficking case discovered in Miami. Members of the U.S. mafia were staying at the Royal Dutch Hotel and others of similar category in Costa Rica. Colombians, Australians, and North Americans are implicated in the drug trafficking case, police officials have reported. The control tower is partly responsible for not demanding all the documents and requisites for the flight to leave. The OIJ has arrested Mr Roberto (Benedictis), civil aviation director, for complicity in the marijuana trafficking discovered in Miami after a plane of the (EXACO) Airline was seized. Mr (Benedictis) was aware of the flight which was to be made to load the marijuana in Colombia and take it to the United States, the OIJ officials added. Mr Roberto (Benedictis), however, did not advise the respective authorities and, although he was not in agreement with the operation, he preferred to remain silent. The control tower was to blame in the traffic. The Judicial Investigation police said that the control tower of Juan Santamaria International Airport was partly responsible for the marijuana traffic by the (EXACO) airplane because it failed to completely fill out the control log which indicates the place of exit, destination, and type of mission to be carried out. The Costa Ricans were pressured by the U.S. mafia members when they decided to quit the group and they and their family were threatened, thus forcing them to continue being part of the mafia. [Text] [PA221843 San Jose Radio RELOJ in Spanish 1200 GMT 22 Aug 80]

SPADAFORA DENIES ORGANIZING BRIGADES--Panamanian guerrilla leader Dr Hugo Spadafora today said in San Jose, Costa Rica, that he is not organizing any armed brigades to fight in El Salvador. Spadafora is well-known in Nicaragua where he fought next to Sandinist guerrillas in the campaign to overthrow the Somozist tyrants in 1979. In statements to newsmen in San Jose, Doctor Spadafora said he was visiting friends he made during the Sandinist campaign. Spadafora told newsmen that more armed brigades will be organized in Latin America to fight against the fascist tyrannies in the continent. Rodolfo Quiros, Costa Rican immigration department chief inspector, said he did not know anything about Spadafora's arrival in Costa Rica. Spadafora said that he had come into the country legally. According to Spadafora, the situation in El Salvador is similar to the one that existed

in Nicaragua: The people are being led by a military vanguard which is handling the struggle against the government very well. Spadafora does not believe that Sandinism will become a leftwing movement. From what I can see there is press freedom. I believe that they are observing democratic pluralism. The newspaper LA PRENSA has strongly criticized the government. In a way this proves that there is press freedom, Spadafora pointed out. [Text] [PA050057 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 0300 GMT 4 Sep 80]

CSO: 3010

MACHADO VENTURA SPEAKS TO SUGAR WORKERS

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 11 Aug 80 p 3

[Speech by Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, member of the Politburo of the CC of the PCC, at end of national ceremony for Sugar Worker Day held at the 30 de Noviembre sugar mill, Pinar del Rio Province, on 6 Aug 80, "Year of the Second Congress": "Party at All Levels Must Take Concrete Measures to Guarantee Present Repairs, Carry out Efficient Sugar Harvest in 1981"]

[Text] Fifty-year comrades and nationally distinguished workers:

Comrades:

Exactly 20 years ago, on 6 August 1960, our commander in chief, Fidel Castro, gave a historic and unforgettable speech at the closing of the First Latin American Youth Congress held in Havana. He announced to the world the nationalization of the major U.S. companies in our country including the 36 Yankee-owned sugar mills in Cuba.

Today, two decades after the revolution's strong response to the growing aggression of imperialism in its desire to frustrate the relentless advance of the revolutionary process of our people, it gives us immense satisfaction to celebrate Sugar Worker Day at the 30 de Noviembre sugar mill, the first mill constructed in our country after the January 1959 triumph and also the first mill constructed in the past 55 years.

No other place would be as propitious to commemorate such a significant event since this new mill, the pride of our sugar industry, is a symbol of the strength of the revolution and our people in their tenacious fight for economic development and for progress on the road to socialist construction in spite of the threatening presence of Yankee imperialism. At the very beginning of the Cuban revolutionary process, Yankee imperialism began to carry out criminal plans to defeat this process.

At the beginning, the imperialists did not even think that a true revolution had triumphed in Cuba. They relied on the possibility of maintaining control of the internal affairs of the country as they had done for more

than 50 years under the subjugated republic. After verifying the extraordinary political dimension of the Cuban revolution and watching its stimulating effect on the oppressed peoples of America, they resorted to their traditional maneuvers and economic boycotts, formulas they had used on numerous occasions against progressive governments throughout the world.

Nevertheless, instead of destabilizing the revolution and weakening the conscience of the people, the continual Yankee aggression contributed to rapid radicalization of the Cuban revolutionary process which had penetrated the masses so deeply.

Our revolutionary government responded to the criminal suppression of the sugar quota which Cuba had supplied to U.S. markets for almost a century with the nationalization of the U.S. mills in our country. That was the revolutionary and energetic response of a people ready to defend their dignity, their sovereignty and their conquests after almost a century of unsuccessful struggle. That was the materialization of Fidel's warning concerning the imperialist threat: "They will take away our quota pound by pound and we will take away their mills one by one; we will take away all the U.S. investments in Cuba centavo by centavo."

We were merely recovering our legitimate right to the main economic sector of our country on which the support of millions of Cubans depended. We were merely returning to the people the goods and wealth snatched from them and offering them the basic prerogative of enjoying the fruits of their own labor.

For many years the sugar worker was subjected to the most inhuman living conditions. He earned a miserable wage paid in promissory notes that mortgaged his very existence; to this were added the terrible unemployed time, hunger, lack of housing and death while the fruits of his hard work filled the coffers of the native bourgeoisie and the Yankee capitalists.

One of the most beautiful achievements of the revolution in power was recovery for the people of the products of the sweat of men who had been robbed and deprived of all their rights from the field to the mill and from the evil era of slavery to the equally unjust time of capitalist exploitation.

Sugar Workers Celebrate This Date Marking Beginning of Process of Economic Foundation for Construction of Socialism in Our Country

That is the reason that the sugar workers celebrate this date which marks the beginning of the process of economic foundation for the construction of socialism in our country. On that historic 6 August, nationalization was announced not only of the sugar mills but also U.S. oil refineries and branches of different Yankee multinational companies in our country. Expropriating our primary industry to benefit the working people was a fatal blow to the foreign monopolies and filled the dispossessed for whom a new fatherland was being forged with hope. This was a true sign of the radical nature of the revolution.

Twenty years have passed during which there have been profound socioeconomic transformations in sugar production which have fully justified the confidence that the masses have placed in the revolution since the beginning.

In spite of our objective limitations, the U.S. blockade, U.S. aggression, the departure of technicians and our own inexperience in administering such complex agriculture and industry, the balance today between that past of misery, exploitation and uncertainty and our present is very favorable for the revolution.

The agricultural cane worker, the sugar worker and the cane peasant are no longer laborers discriminated against and humiliated as they were in previous generations. They are free men, owners of the means of production, who participate consciously in the production process since they know that the fruits of their labor do not enrich any national monopoly or exploiter. On the contrary, the wealth created by their work is used to benefit all the people through the construction of hospitals, schools, housing, highways, factories, power lines, etc.

All the sugar mills and 80 percent of the land used for cane cultivation are social property; that is, they belong to all the people. The remaining 20 percent of the land is in the hands of peasant workers, firm allies of the socialist revolution, who have already advanced toward superior forms of production by joining cooperatives.

Twenty years ago, almost all the land was prepared for cane by using oxen and small plows. Now almost all that land including the land belonging to the peasants is prepared by using tractors and more efficient plows.

Under capitalism, all the cane was cut and reaped manually and 85 percent was transported in oxcarts. Now more than 45 percent of the cane is cut with combines and more than 97 percent of the rest is reaped by machine; 85 percent of the total cane is harvested with motorized equipment.

Chemical fertilization and weeding have been introduced on a large scale in cane agriculture; they were hardly used under capitalism. New varieties of cane have been introduced, many of which have been created by Cuban technicians.

The irrigated area is more than five times larger. Large and small dams have been built and the use of subterranean water has increased.

In these 20 years, there has been a profound transformation in the means of production used in cane agriculture. There are now more than 2,000 crawler tractors, more than 30,000 rubber-tired tractors, some 3,800 cane reapers, more than 2,500 combines for cutting cane, some 8,000 trucks and tens of thousands of implements for mechanized cane cultivation.

In order to repair and maintain this equipment, a network of hundreds of shops has been established and a great quantity of portable shops has been acquired.

Some 500 collection stations have been constructed to increase the productivity of manual cutting and to complement mechanized cutting. This has also made it possible to extend electrification to large agricultural areas.

The greatest transformation has been in the men who carry out the production process. Under capitalism, the main work instruments were the hoe, machete, small plow and animal power. Now the agricultural cane worker uses a combine to cut the cane, tractors, reapers, fumigators, etc. The backward agricultural worker under capitalism has become an equipment operator, mechanic, welder, fumigation technician, etc.

Manual cane cutting has gone from individual cutters or pairs of cutters to brigades of 30 to 40 workers; this has increased the productivity of the cutter. The cane peasants have been incorporated into this system of cutting, changing their old individual work habits.

This brigade system of manual cutting has led to a powerful million-arroba movement which "today is one of the fundamental pillars in our battle for productivity and for the reduction of the work force required for the sugar harvest to the minimum," according to comrade Fidel in his report to the First Party Congress.

Under Capitalism 350,000 Workers Cut, Reaped Cane Manually; Now Only
150,000 Cutters Are Needed, a Decrease of 200,000 Cane Cutters

In these 20 years, due to the introduction of mechanization in cane agriculture, hundreds of thousands of workers have been freed from the hard work of cutting and reaping cane. Under capitalism, some 350,000 workers were used to cut and reap the cane manually; now only 150,000 cutters are used, a decrease of 200,000 cane cutters.

There have also been transformations in the sugar industry although they have not been as major as in agriculture. Large resources have been allocated to restore, modernize and expand the mills and automation has begun.

The system of bulk sugar handling which did not exist under capitalism has been introduced; now 80 percent of our raw sugar exports are shipped in this form.

Capacity in the mechanical industry which produces equipment and parts for the sugar industry has been expanded. This means that a major part of the components of the new mills can be nationally produced.

Also our universities and other technical education centers and those in socialist countries have trained thousands of new specialists in cane agriculture and the sugar industry. More than 60 technical and polytechnical schools have been constructed near the mills to train the new skilled workers needed for cane agriculture and the sugar industry.

Our present level of development has permitted us to go on to the construction of new mills designed by Cuban technicians; a major part of their equipment is constructed by our mechanical industry.

Research centers have been established for the development of new varieties of cane, for the study of soils and fertilizers and for the development of new cane derivatives.

We can state, without fear of being mistaken, that in the past 20 years the Cuban working class has made glorious achievements in the maintenance and development of sugar production.

In his report to the First Party Congress, comrade Fidel stated: "At the beginning of the revolution, the sugar industry was badly hurt. The traditional markets were eliminated by imperialism. Purchases of equipment, parts and material from habitual suppliers became impossible and there was an extraordinary drain of skilled cadres."

Humble men of the people, frequently with less than a sixth-grade education, had to assume leadership functions in the industrial and agricultural processes.

In the first years of the revolution, unemployment was eliminated and cane cutters were needed; this was one of our country's most difficult problems. Our selfless workers and laborers mobilized for cane cutting along with soldiers and intermediate students made the harvests possible in those difficult years and also dignified this work.

During those difficult years and now, our country had the material support and the solidarity of the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, which bought all the sugar that the Yankees no longer bought. Today they buy larger quantities at a fair price, have supplied us with equipment, tractors and parts and have helped us develop mechanization. A combine factory has been built and the mechanical industry has been expanded.

Today no one questions the fact that the working class which made it possible to maintain and expand sugar production in spite of the blockade and imperialist aggression is in a better position now to confront the new tasks of the present stage.

As is known, sugar-cane rust had a serious effect on cane production. Combined with inadequate clearing in the past year and lack of fulfillment of the 1978 winter sowing quota, this caused a decrease in sugar production in 1980 compared to 1979.

To guarantee the greatest quantity of cane possible for the 1981 sugar harvest, we had the largest spring sowing of this 5-year period and also the largest clearing campaign. It is necessary to continue keeping the cane clear and free of weeds and to use the irrigation systems to the maximum.

It is necessary to make good repairs in the mills and harvest equipment, giving more attention to everything that caused problems in the past harvest.

One of the main problems in past repairs was the delayed arrival of supplies to the enterprises. Therefore, the administrative organizations must maintain strict supervision over this task and continue holding meetings in provinces to supervise and solve problems that can occur up until the beginning of the harvest.

As has already been stated, it is necessary to make an objective plan for the harvest, keeping in mind the criteria of the party organizations, the enterprises and the provinces. It is not possible to continue planning cutting capacity that cannot be met; this results in prolongation of the harvest which makes it difficult to sow and cultivate the cane.

According to the methodology of MINAZ [Ministry of the Sugar Industry], the provinces must determine the daily mechanized cutting capacity of the regular labor force and of the EJT [Youth Labor Army]. The difference compared to the potential quota of each mill will have to be met with volunteer forces. Each province will have to indicate which sectors it proposes to take these forces from in order to handle this with the central state organizations when necessary.

The wage laws governing the next sugar harvest must be dictated so that the worker movement can discuss the conditions with each worker who is mobilized.

The worker movement and the administrations must take measures to select the best cutters in order to guarantee productions that must be maintained.

The CTC [Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions], the unions, ANAP [National Association of Small Farmers] and the EJT must work to organize the greatest number of workers possible in million-arroba brigades in order to increase discipline and productivity.

The CTC must also take measures to improve emulation in the sugar harvest, making it more dynamic and insuring good participation by the workers.

The cane enterprises and the people's government organs must take measures when possible to improve the living conditions of the harvest workers as well as supplies based on resources available. This is also true concerning housing, recreation, sanitation, etc.

Strategy for 1981 Harvest Is for All Mills to Begin on Schedule, Keep Grinding at Maximum Capacity

The strategy that will be followed in the 1981 harvest is for all the sugar mills to begin on the scheduled date and keep grinding at their maximum capacity. Therefore, they must be in good repair and have full supplies of cane.

It will be necessary to have an efficient harvest in order to obtain the maximum quantity of sugar from the available cane. Also the fight to improve the sugar quality will continue.

With respect to the 1982 sugar harvest which we must work on now, it is necessary to meet the 1980 winter sowing quota by 31 December; it is running behind now. It is necessary to intensify work with land preparation machinery and to plant well.

The largest spring sowing will be done in the first half of 1981--some 26,000 caballerias--so a number of organizational measures must be taken in time concerning machinery, training operators for the new equipment and cutting the leftover cane so that the land preparation equipment can be fully exploited.

We have a very important task at the end of October: the First Sugar Union Congress. It again unites the agricultural cane workers and the sugar industry workers under the glorious banners of Jesus Menendez' union which won so many conquests in the fight against imperialism and capitalist exploitation. The CTC and the party must give more attention to this assembly process so that this union can be strengthened and can face the great tasks it has before it.

As can be seen, the immediate tasks that the administration, the workers and the party must confront require maximum organization and explanation to the masses so that they know about them and can be mobilized to achieve the objectives outlined by the party leadership.

Comrades:

We know that, in spite of the efforts of the revolution to benefit the sugar workers, there are still things that are behind schedule such as the repair and construction of housing and the creation of recreational facilities and services in the areas where our workers live. This is due, first, to the fact that our country has had to create the material base for education and health and to defend the revolution during this time. Also it has had to develop highways and railways and to construct hundreds of factories and shops to expand other production necessary for our economy.

There are social problems in the agricultural cane areas and in the sugar mills and problems with services; some places do not have communications. There are also some problems with wages and their form of payment and weekly time off.

The proposed economic and social guidelines for the 5-year period 1981-1985 now being discussed will be submitted to the consideration of the Second Party Congress. They establish the need to resolve most of these problems based on available resources and to give them the treatment they deserve due to the importance of sugar production.

Also those guidelines propose to increase the agricultural yield of cane to 70,000 or 80,000 arrobas per caballeria and even 90,000 arrobas in some provinces.

They also propose to increase the capacity of the sugar industry through the construction of new mills and the expansion of existing ones and to improve their efficiency.

Both aspects are presented with the objective of producing between 10 million and 10.5 million metric tons of sugar base 96° by 1985.

To increase sugar production in the coming years until reaching the figures established for 1985 has become the basic economic task of the next 5-year period. The rest of our possibilities for economic and social development depend on this to a great extent.

To create the conditions for fulfillment of this task, the party and the government have taken and will continue to take measures aimed at that objective.

Cane agriculture and the sugar industry have been combined under a single state organization, MINAZ, which will direct all this activity.

As we said before, all the agricultural cane workers and the sugar industry workers will soon be united under a single union in order to work together for the same objectives.

The guidelines for the Second Party Congress show the need to begin to solve the housing, wage and other social problems that affect the cane and sugar workers to prevent their departure to other sectors and also to bring in new workers needed to expand this production.

These measures in themselves are not enough if the administrative and union leaders and party organizations do not try to solve the problems that we have in production today. For example, the country has provided the cane enterprises with large quantities of machines and equipment that are not used to their full capacity. Cane planting is done with poor quality and losses are high; cultivation, clearing, fertilizing and use of irrigation are inadequate.

All this leads to low yields per caballeria because of low amounts of cane per area. About 20 percent of our present cane fields are bare.

With the present resources and those that will be made available to cane agriculture in the next 5-year period, it is possible to meet and surpass the yields per caballeria planned for 1985.

To do this, it is necessary to increase discipline and demand as the party leadership has stated.

The sugar industry still has reserves in capacity and efficiency. With the resources allocated to it in the next 5-year period and working in an organized way, it can carry out the planned expansions for 1985.

As you know, one of the basic problems that we will have to solve for future sugar harvests will be cane cutting. It is necessary to prepare the present areas for mechanized cutting properly and to expand them as much as possible, to train personnel for mechanized cutting adequately, to organize forces for manual cutting and to increase their productivity.

We Are Confident that Sugar Workers, Worthy Heirs of Jesus Menendez' Struggle and Combat, Will Not Fail

If at the beginning of the 5-year period we make concrete, concise plans for each year of the 5-year period and for each production unit, cane enterprise and sugar mill, if we discuss them with the workers and if we specify the tasks we must fulfill, we are confident that the sugar workers, worthy heirs of Jesus Menendez' struggle and combat, will not fail.

Naturally, fulfillment of the sugar production quotas is the necessary premise in order to be able to satisfy the needs of the cane and sugar workers themselves as stated in the guidelines.

The sugar workers and cane workers must improve their discipline, comply with the workday, increase work productivity and help improve work organization.

The administration must increase its demand to make the entire productive process more efficient.

The new union must work more directly with the workers and defend their rights but also present the tasks that the workers must carry out. Through socialist emulation, it must lead them in the fight to fulfill the objectives of the next 5-year period.

The party has grown in all the mills and cane enterprises and has been strengthened organically and ideologically. It has greater influence among all the working masses.

The party at all levels must take concrete measures to guarantee present repairs, to carry out an efficient sugar harvest in 1981 and to meet the 1980 winter sowing quota.

It is also responsible for guaranteeing the sugar production objectives for the next 5-year period, organizing and demanding fulfillment of tasks, convincing the working masses and encouraging them in the fight to increase productivity and production as the only way to solve other social and wage problems. I must not end without first giving all of you warmest and most deserved congratulations in the name of our party.

We are convinced that the heroic sugar workers, through their dignity, their spirit of sacrifice, their history and their tradition as revolutionary workers, will fulfill all the guidelines of the party and Fidel. They will not fail in this great task.

Long live the sugar workers union!

Long live the PCC (Communist Party of Cuba)!

Long live Fidel!

7717

CSO: 3010

MILITARY REGISTRATION FOR 16-YEAR-OLDS ANNOUNCED

Havana GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW in English 31 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] Pursuant to the provision of Law 1244 of 1973 on General Military Service (SMG), all Cuban males born in 1964 must register with the SMG in the period September 1 through October 31 of the current year. Municipal registration committees will be set up all over Cuba for this purpose.

Students on scholarship must register in the municipalities where the schools are located. Citizens born in 1964 who are abroad during the period of registration must go to the nearest Cuban embassy or consulate and get registered in the Book of Cuban Citizens of Military Age, and upon their return to Cuba must register with the SMG by submitting the document confirming their stay abroad.

At the municipal registration committees, registrants must submit the following documents:

Identification card or minor's card

School certificate

Health certificate or, if available, personal hospital record

Two identity card photos (4 x 5 cm)

Registrants who are not regular students must submit a school certificate showing last grade passed.

Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces

CSO: 3020

ISOLATION OF NEW BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT NOTED

Havana GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW in English 31 Aug 80 p 11

[Text] There's no doubt that the fascist military junta is having a lot of trouble in its efforts to gain recognition. So far, few governments seem to be interested in dictator Luis Garcia Meza and his cohorts.

Garcia Meza will be hard put to find justification for the coup. First of all, a legitimate election was held in Bolivia on June 29 of this year, and the people elected the president and a Congress in keeping with a bourgeois democracy. And secondly, that was the third consecutive victory in the last three years for the Democratic People's Unity Party (UDP) and its presidential candidate Hernan Siles Suazo.

It's almost impossible to cast doubts on this triple victory and the desires of the Bolivian people. Three elections in a row, with the same results, constituted a resounding defeat for the fascist military.

It won't be easy for the governments of the area and the world as a whole to ignore this reality or to convince the public of the reasons for granting recognition to the putachists, who have been charged with being killers and drug traffickers.

Garcia Meza told the world that the fascists had staged the coup to save Bolivia from becoming "a satellite of international communism." Next, he invited all "friendly" countries to send delegations to Bolivia and see for themselves that human rights were respected there. However, it seems as if he's wasting his time because, barring a few exceptions, nobody has paid any attention to his pleas.

The first country to recognize the junta was Argentina, whose military regime has been accused by everybody in and outside Bolivia of being the instigator of the putsch.

In contrast to the wave of resignations by Bolivian ambassadors all over the world, Garcia Meza announced that the ambassador in Buenos Aires had remained in his post.

The next countries to recognize the junta were Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Guatemala and El Salvador. Curiously enough, all of them are ruled by military regimes and none of them can boast of respecting human rights. Chile did not grant recognition on account of an old feud between the two countries that has to do with border problems. Shortly after the coup, the Bolivian dictator issued a statement to the effect that his country would reestablish relations with Chile. This was followed by a denial which, to all appearances, was an attempt to remedy a faux pas.

Recognition from the other side of the world came first from South Africa, the country of apartheid, and Israel, spearhead of U. S. imperialism in the Middle East. Next came the acknowledgement from Anwar Sadat, the vilest most treacherous president Egypt ever had to put up with, followed by Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand, to complete the roster of the junta's "friends."

No other country has extended recognition, for the move would be so unpopular. There have been reports to the effect that some countries will soon recognize the Bolivian regime. But so far, the fascist military coup has aroused such feelings of indignation and condemnation that the international isolation of the junta has become a real headache for dictator Luis Garcia Meza.

CSO: 3020

BRIEFS

ALMEIDA PROVINCIAL PLENUM ATTENDANCE--Commander of the Revolution Juan Almeida Bosque, member of the party Politburo, yesterday attended the 16th Plenum of the Provincial Party Committee in Camaguey which was chaired by Provincial Party First Secretary Lazaro Vasquez Garcia. The main report to the provincial [party] meeting, which will be held on 27 September, was read at the plenum. The report deals with the party work done since the previous party meeting in 1977. The second point on the plenum's agenda was an examination of objectives for the next period [as heard, presumably 3 years]. During the entire process of discussion and analysis of the two documents, the participants in the plenum made numerous presentations to propose changes and additions which helped to enhance the documents. Party Central Committee members Lino Carreras, Rene de los Santos and Facundo Martinez Vaillant--who is chairman of the party control and review committee in Camaguey Province--accompanied Commander of the Revolution Juan Almeida Bosque. [Text] [FL101746 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1700 GMT 10 Sep 80]

NATIONAL CULTURE DAY--Armando Hart Davalos, member of the Politburo and minister of culture, has announced that 20 October has been officially declared the Day of National Culture. The minister said that this date had been chosen because the Cuban national anthem was first sung on that date in Bayamo. [FL111121 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1045 GMT 11 Sep 80]

HAVANA CDR CELEBRATION--Julio Canacho Aguilera, member of the secretariat and first party secretary in Havana city, last night made the closing remarks at the ceremony that the Havana city Province committees for the Defence of the Revolution [CDR] held to celebrate the organization's 20th anniversary. Jose Antonio Gellnoa, CDR coordinator in Havana City Province, reported on the tasks carried out by the provincial CDR in 1980 in honor of the anniversary; among them, more than 48,000 blood donations and the collection of 3.3 million pounds of cardboard and 42,000 ounces of used stamps. [FL111121 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1045 GMT 11 Sep 80]

PORTS CARGO HANDLING WORK--At a meeting with port terminal directors and dock workers union leaders at the national level, party secretariat member Jorge Risquet has declared that the cargo handling plan for the past 3 months

was overfulfilled. He said that over that period a total of 2,218,000 tons of merchandise were unloaded or 24 percent more than in the same period last year. Risquet added that Cuban ports began September with 367,000 tons aboard ships [to be unloaded], stressing that this figure should be reduced to 250,000 tons to be considered normal and to preclude demurrage. He said that organizational deficiencies, irresponsibility, bureaucracy and lack of exigency should be eradicated. [FL112330 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1802 GMT 11 Sep 80]

CITRUS PRODUCTION INCREASE--Citrus production in this country doubled during the 1970 to 1979 decade with a production in 1979 of 285,000 metric tons. This was announced today at a citrus industry review meeting. Omar Fernandez, director of citrus and fruits in the Agriculture Ministry, reported at the meeting that fruit production in 1979 was two and one-half times more than in 1970. He noted the importance of citrus development to obtain foreign exchange and said that exports rose 4.4 times during the decade. [FL102336 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 2300 GMT 10 Sep 80]

CSO: 3010

EL SALVADOR

STATION SAYS U.S., SALVADORAN INTERESTS INCOMPATIBLE

PA030402 San Salvador La Voz Panamericana in Spanish 0237 GMT 2 Sep 80

[Station commentary: "The U.S. Attitude Towards El Salvador"]

[Excerpts] A 3-member commission headed by Monsignor McCarthy, bishop of Galveston, representing the U.S. Episcopal Conference, has come to El Salvador to learn about the country's situation. Its main concern is to understand the real significance of the general program of repression with reforms sponsored by the state department and the current military-christian democratic junta.

If the North Americans see that their control over Central America is in danger, they will not hesitate to intervene, either through the Marines, the OAS, Guatemala or a Bolivian-style coup; anything, rather than permit the Revolutionary Democratic Front to assume power. The United States does not want to admit two essential things: 1. That it is mainly responsible for the structural injustice in El Salvador. U.S. capitalism has essentially generated local capitalism and the country's main economic structures as necessary by-products. 2. U.S. police is mainly responsible for all the regimes we have experienced in the region. The North Americans supported Somoza and Somozism for 40 years. They overthrew Arbenz and his reformist government. They sponsored the solutions and the frauds of the National Conciliation Party in El Salvador. They trained almost all the military officers who have directed the repression in the region. The United States is the main promoter and defender of capitalism, a capitalism which is very beneficial for it but which has been disastrous for the Third World countries.

As a result of this, the United States and El Salvador cannot have common interests. To a great extent, they are opposites. Therefore, the United States can only expect from us neutrality or nonbelligerency. It cannot expect either our submission or support. There are many good people in the United States. There are many people who truly love us and help us but as a state, the United States continues to maintain interests contrary to ours.

CSO: 3010

EL SALVADOR

CHURCH DEMANDS U.S. 'NOT INTERVENE'

PA312036 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1650 GMT 31 Aug 80

[Text] San Salvador, 31 Aug (ACAN-EFE)--The Salvadoran Church demanded here today that U.S. President Jimmy Carter "not intervene" in El Salvador.

"We ask the United States not to intervene, please, just as we ask any type of Soviet or Cuban imperialism not to intervene in the problems of our country," Father Fabian Amaya Torres said on preaching the Sunday homily of the Salvadoran Archbishopric.

Msgr Arturo Rivera y Damas, apostolic administrator of the archdiocese, was at another Salvadoran diocese after his return from San Jose, Costa Rica, where he participated as a special guest in the meeting of presidents of Episcopalian conferences of Central America. The mass was held by Msgr John McCarthy, bishop of Galveston and Houston, Texas.

Amaya asked McCarthy and his companions, Fathers Bryan Hehir and Thomas Quigley, "to echo the voice of the martyr archbishop of El Salvador," Msgr Oscar Arnulfo Romero, who at the beginning of the year before he was assassinated demanded that the U.S. Government cease its military assistance to the ruling Salvadoran junta. Romero's request was not heeded by President Jimmy Carter, whose government has reiterated its support on various occasions to the ruling group in this Central American country.

Amaya also said that the church demands that the government "put an end to repression, lift the state of siege and the national emergency" in El Salvador as prior conditions for a dialogue to take place between the government and the leftists.

"The church cannot agree with the so-called 'executions' of the left, it cannot agree with the burning of buses or kidnappings or with those who kill those who are kidnapped. We do not agree that fear should be spread among the civilian population," Amaya said in one of the harshest condemnations in the past few months of the leftist groups' activities in El Salvador. "Therefore we cannot be in agreement with the repression, which is both collective and selective" by the government against the popular organizations, Amaya said.

"We also do not agree that military solutions should be applied to labor or political problems," he added.

Amaya said that "the United States shares a large part of the fault for the repression that is being maintained."

"The reforms have not been complemented with a halt to repression" in El Salvador, Amaya said, noting U.S. responsibility in the conflict.

"There is still time to halt this bloodbath" if a national dialogue is undertaken, added the priest, who is one of the people most closely identified with the progressive trend of the Catholic Church in El Salvador.

CSO: 3010

AGRARIAN REFORMS PRAISED, LEFTIST VIOLENCE CONDEMNED

San Salvador LA PRENSA GRAFICA in Spanish 29 Aug 80 pp 7, 39

Article by Salvador Ajuria Guillen]

[Text] Since the Communist Party of El Salvador was founded, its major grievance and ambition has always been the agrarian reform, handing over the land to the men who farm it.

This was set forth in the works of Abel Cuenca, Alejandro D. Marroquin and Migeul Angel Vasquez, political science experts who advised the Salvadoran Communist Party from Mexico.

As far as Cuenca was concerned, the most urgent thing was to do away with the feudal system of tenant farmers and sharecroppers. Marroquin argued that the land and the means of farm production should be transferred to peasant farmer cooperative unions. Vasquez advocated that the state should market basic farm products.

These three major objectives, for the benefit or to the detriment of the Salvadoran people, have been accomplished by the Revolutionary Government Junta in a summary legal proceeding that was not devoid of errors but without the need to install a communist system. We have carried out a unique agrarian reform in Latin America that is expected to immediately benefit more than one quarter of the population. Exports of coffee, sugar, cotton, etc are now under state control. The banking system was nationalized.

The agrarian reform process destroyed the large landed estates and did away with "tenant farmers," "land rent" and other feudal holdovers. In a word, it freed peasant farmers from contemptible bonds and opened up new roads to the future for them.

State control of primary exports will help the country's economy by bringing in foreign exchange, and if the nationalized banking industry can be isolated from political deals, it could make loans available to segments of the population that it has never before benefited.

Strangely enough, Salvadoran Communists have reacted negatively to these changes. They are killing, as if they were enemies, the peasant farmers who have been freed from feudal bonds and who are finally the owners of the land that for generations they farmed for others. They have destroyed crops and burned down warehouses, ruining farm machinery and tools, etc. They enter the estates expropriated by the agrarian reform and shoot down the leaders and technical advisers of the cooperatives.

Those responsible for this massacre of peasant farmers are plainly insane. They suffer from what Lenin called "the infantile disease of communism," a disoriented extremism that goes beyond fanaticism and unprovoked hatred. Leftist leaders lack a strategic approach in keeping with current political realities.

I came to this country because the news being published in Mexico about the current situation in El Salvador distorts the facts and causes alarm. I have found a very thought-provoking process, substantial changes in old structures, changes based on an advanced democratic philosophy. What is being done ought to have the enthusiastic backing of the entire Salvadoran people, because the efforts are for their benefit.

It is a shame that violence is interrupting this process. If the policy of the right wing is reprehensible because it is obstinate, the policy of the left wing is negative, sectarian and devoid of political skill because it is blind. The far left is committing such serious mistakes that it has made its cause unpopular and its goals repulsive. In a process aiming at democratic revolution, a left wing blinded to the point of lapsing into a counterrevolutionary posture is inconceivable.

8743

CSO: 3010

WORKING PEOPLE SEEN AS OPPOSED TO TERRORISM

PA031821 San Salvador Domestic Service in Spanish 1910 GMT 2 Sep 80

[Station commentary]

[Text] In their bulletins for foreign consumption the leftist extremist groups list the destruction of public utilities as accomplishments of their "prolonged war." The blowing up of highways to obstruct traffic, the sabotage of electric power transmission lines and other terrorist acts are part of a general plan the leftist guerrillas of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) are implementing in our country to inflict heavy damage on the revolutionary government.

These groups do not realize that what they destroy is not the property of the government but of all the people and that the damage is inflicted on the people, who provide the funds to construct these public utilities.

The political fanaticism of these terrorists makes them completely blind and prevents them from understanding that the people increasingly repudiate their destructive actions.

In the last few days the extremists have been threatening the lives and businesses of market stall owners simply because they, people, do not support terrorism. All they want is to work and make a living from what they sell every day and support their children, virtues which have no ideology.

Therefore the directives of the FDR are off the mark and its groups are destroying things that belong to the people when they try to win support by coercion and terrorism. It is obvious that these individuals are desperate because they have lost the domestic battle due to the widespread rejection of their actions against the people.

CSO: 3010

GRENADA

BRIEFS

PRICES INCREASE--The Grenada Central Statistical Office today released a retail price index for the months of June and July for items ranging from food and fuel to clothing and household supplies. According to the figures released, prices for all items rose by 36.1 percent from January of last year to July of this year. This indicates a general rise in prices of 3.03 percent since the month of June this year and a rise of 13.13 percent since the beginning of 1980. [Text] [FL262051 St George's Radio Free Grenada in English 2030 GMT 26 Aug 80]

MINISTER'S RETURN--Agriculture Minister Brother Unison Whiteman has returned home after attending a one-day meeting of Windward Islands Banana Minister [as heard] in St Lucia. One of the topics discussed was a comprehensive plan to rehabilitate the banana industry following the destruction caused by hurricane Allen in August. Another was getting a better price for bananas. [FL020234 St George's Radio Free Grenada in English 2330 GMT 1 Sep 80]

CYPRIOT E N V O Y--The high commissioner-designate of Cyprus to Grenada, His Excellency Mr (Michael Sherifis), presented his credentials to Acting Governor General (Allan Licronet) at Government House yesterday. Mr (Sherifis), who arrived in the country on Friday, is his country's high commissioner to the United Nations. Today he paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Brother Maurice Bishop. The Cyprus high commissioner is expected to pay courtesy calls on other ministers of the People's Revolutionary Government. He will also visit Brother Julian Rizo, Cuban ambassador to Grenada. Grenada established diplomatic relations with Cyprus on the 29th of April this year. [FL110056 St George's Radio Free Grenada in English 2330 GMT 10 Sep 80]

CSO: 3020

GUATEMALA

NEGATIVE U.S. ARTICLE ON CENTRAL AMERICA SCORED

Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 28 Aug 80 p 10

[Article by Alvaro Contreras Velez]

[Text] Even though, as Galileo Galilei would say, it is still afloat, one does not have to be a genius in political science or economics to realize by just taking a look at this explosive region that Central America is a ship that is sinking in sections as the storm of subversion grows, the first consequences of which were felt in Nicaragua and are now manifesting themselves in El Salvador.

As I said in yesterday's column, violence and its attendant crimes, terrorism and agitation is just one of the serious problems that have helped to project to our own people and to outsiders the image of a sort of tropical Titanic that will be unable to avoid shipwreck.

Such is the case, among so many others, of the article entitled "Central America, the Land of the Smoking Gun" that appeared in the 18 August issue of TIME and that begins with this offensive quote: "We are in the most savage country and among the most savage people that we have ever seen." According to the authors of the article in question, Hernando Cortes said this in 1524 about Guatemala.

"And this," the report adds, "was just one the many damaging stereotypes about Central America. In the 1850's in the United States, at the height of manifest destiny, the region was mainly regarded as 'an inviting target for territorial expansion.'"

The above is just an appetizer. The main courses come later, in the form of slanted and ill-intentioned descriptions of the situations in each of the five countries. Given this menu, any foreign businessman would obviously prefer to go without eating rather than invest a cent in the area.

This publicity offensive, with its accurate, high-caliber weapons, further agitates the waters around the sinking vessel, and even

though things in Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica are not as calamitous as in Nicaragua and El Salvador, the economies of the former three are experiencing tough times.

With inflation galloping ahead, the specter of recession is beginning to loom from one end of the isthmus to the other. The common market, which was a great hope and which for a time yielded excellent fruit for all, is reminiscent today of the enormous, sad figure of old, sickly elephants that instinctively look for a place to die somewhere in the jungle.

And in the midst of a jungle of iron and cement, fraught with insecurity, fear and brutal, pitiless beasts with the appearance of human beings, millions of Central Americans see how the high cost of living is also an invitation to resentment and futile protests.

Passing through Guatemala recently, Mexican economist Luis Pazos, an expert on the situation and an analyst who, atypically, expresses himself clearly and courageously (even when talking about his own country), said, as an outsider, what everyone already knows. His diagnosis of the ills besetting our countries was accurate and sincere but hardly novel.

It is true that the tempest is lashing, and there are no signs of a letup. It grows more violent every day. The ship tosses about like a nutshell dragged along by the current, unable to get free. But despite the squall, the politicians are still battling for the captainship of the vessel because, whether afloat or on the bottom, they know how to profit from it.

8743

CSO: 3010

GUATEMALA

FOREIGN MINISTER APPROVES TRAVEL TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 15 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] "I see no reason for not traveling to socialist countries when it involves beneficial activities which can be to the advantage of Guatemala," engineer Rafael Castillo Valdez, minister of foreign relations, has said in commenting on statements made by Leonel Sisneiga Otero, MLN [National Liberation Movement] deputy.

As was reported in yesterday's edition, Sisneiga Otero has said: "It is unworthy of a minister of Guatemala or any other government official to go to communist countries which are considered enemies of our country."

The congressman was referring to a press report in which it was indicated that engineer Edgar Ponciano Castillo, minister of agriculture, will attend a meeting organized by the FAO which will take place in Havana, Cuba, in the early part of September.

It Can Be Beneficial

When asked about the statements by the MLN deputy, Minister Castillo Valdez said that Guatemala is 100 percent democratic, that this is guaranteed by President Lucas Garcia and that freedom of speech is one of its main characteristics.

"Every citizen," he said, "may express his opinions on any subject and all the more so when a deputy is involved who represents a large number of Guatemalans. On this basis, I respect congressman Sisneiga Otero's opinion.

"In this case, the event to be held in Havana includes important subjects which will benefit our country. It is being organized by the FAO, a UN agency.

"On many occasions, Guatemalan delegations have attended meetings at that level in socialist countries, including Russia, the PRC and others, in order to learn about the advances in technology applicable to certain activities.

"I consider it important that Guatemalans be brought up to date on advances in technology so that after returning to this country the things learned can be put into practice. If what is specifically involved is the acquisition of technical knowledge it is well worth while traveling to whatever country it may be."

Minister Castillo Valdez cited as an example the recent sports delegation which participated in the Olympics held in Moscow.

"I believe, therefore, that it is worthwhile for the minister of agriculture and other Guatemalan officials to attend the meeting which will take place in Havana, Cuba."

9204

C80: 3010

'SOCIALIST' SIGNIFICANCE OF SANDINIST ANNIVERSARY CITED

Guatemala City DIARIO DE CENTRO AMERICA in Spanish 21 Jul 80 pp 3, 6

[Editorial: "True Meaning of Sandinist Anniversary"]

[Text] Let us not be deceived. The United States is a thousand kilometers away, Guatemala is only a few hundred. Let us not lend a deaf ear nor make ill-advised remarks. Central America is going through a serious moment in its history. The characteristics, participating personalities, concepts employed, attitudes brought out and positions adopted at the commemorative ceremonies of the Sandinists which took place in Managua on Saturday, 19 July, call for a review of positions and very serious thinking about the historical circumstances existing in countries of the isthmus at this time.

A review of opinions in Guatemala provides the following kaleidoscope of political appraisals regarding the situation:

The U.S. Line

First, there is a certain attitude which resembles the current U.S. line and which could be defined as "nothing is happening," "all is well," "we have to keep close to the communists who are winning," "we have to join those who are helping in their victory," "we must be with them," "if they criticize and insult us, let us take those things as little vexations, as things that are unimportant," "let us join those who support the triumph of socialism," "let us praise the Soviet-Castroite penetration in America."

This may be the most dangerous, risky and perhaps irresponsible political line that could be followed by the countries threatened by the advance of leftist forces whose goal is power, the takeover of the government, and the submission of more countries to the Communist aegis.

Other institutions and persons believe that the celebration of the first anniversary of the Sandinist victory dispelled many doubts: the socialist world celebrated a milestone in its advance.

The celebration of the first anniversary of the fall of the government presided over by Gen Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua actually constituted an international festival of the socialist triumph, and more specifically of Soviet-Castroite penetration in America.

The Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, spoke out in a speech as if he had been speaking in his own country dominated by a longstanding 20-year-old dictatorship.

He used the same slogans, the same doctrines and the same abuses that he uses in Cuba. He spoke to the Nicaraguans in the same tone and with the same arguments that he uses on his own island. Anyone could gather that for Fidel Castro, Nicaragua is another Cuba now.

The members of Nicaragua's Government Junta expressed their support for the leftist movements of Angola, Namibia and Korea as well as for the Palestinian cause, the independence of Puerto Rico, and the subversive forces in El Salvador. They even went so far as to express their support for an anti-Central American cause, backing the presumptuous independence on Guatemalan soil of Belize.

Ortega said that he was against imperialism, Zionism, etc. It was a feast of socialist words and deeds. It was a show of splendor of what purports to be the triumph of socialism in America and throughout the world.

We should not be misled. With regard to Guatemala, Ortega alluded to Attorney Mario Sandoval Alarcon, leader of the National Liberation Movement (NLM), branding him as a murderer and hurling other insults at him.

The members of the Nicaraguan Government made sparkling allusions in their oratory to capitalistic injustice, to the exploitation of the poor nations and to the low prices paid for raw materials bought from these countries.

Bowdler, one of the schemers in the seizure of power by the Sandinists, had to tolerate and listen to 10 minutes of insults against his country plus the bluster from Castro during the celebration of Somoza's fall, to which he contributed in part.

Important sectors of opinion in Guatemala believe that the Sandinist Government of Nicaragua placed the United States of America in a dilemma in that on the one hand, the United States would feel it was committing an international faux pas by not participating in the celebration of the first anniversary of the overthrow of former President Somoza, while on the other, it ran the risk of being relegated to second place if it did attend. This did in fact place President Carter's government in a very difficult and conflicting situation.

It is considered here that the U.S. delegation had to deal with a critical moment that may possibly have no precedent in its history.

For more than 10 minutes the U.S. delegation--which had already been placed several rows behind the delegations from the socialist countries on the dais--had to listen to insults against its country and its policies, consisting in part of the aspersions cast by Fidel Castro, the foremost personality at that celebration. The harshest attack came during the 8 minutes that Sandinist Junta member Daniel Ortega Saavedra spent recounting a history of Nicaragua as the permanent victim of aggressive U.S. policies, the big stick, interventionism and the exploitation of little countries. He accused the United States of swallowing up Nicaragua, of conspiring with traitors who have committed murder, and of continuing to support dictators, such as Somoza, contrary to all the aspirations of countries subjugated to imperialism.

This version, which constituted a severe censure of the United States, had to be tolerated and listened to with stoic, or rather diplomatic patience by the neat and tidy delegation, headed by the current under secretary of state for Latin American Affairs, William Bowdler, one of the schemers in the seizure of power by the Sandinists in Nicaragua.

Castro spoke clearly: He announced the long calvary of penury and dictatorship that the people of Nicaragua can expect under the Sandinists.

The words spoken by Fidel Castro at the celebration of the first anniversary of the overthrow of former President Anastasio Somoza held in Managua on Saturday, 19 July, clearly illustrates for the Nicaraguan people the harsh calvary that awaits them as a result of the enthronement of a socialist dictatorship under the guise of Sandinism.

Castro told the Nicaraguans that "the road you will have to follow is long," in other words, that this road will be the same one that his regime has imposed in Cuba: 20 years of failure, 20 years of talking about hardships that will have to be overcome, 20 years of promising a higher standard of living, 20 years of presenting the hoax of freedom, of making illusionary promises, and of fantasies that never come true.

The only truth in Cuba is the massive wish of the Cubans to flee from the regime imposed by Castro. The anti-imperialism of which Castro spoke to the Nicaraguans is nothing more than submission to the harshest of true imperialisms, the imperialism of the Soviets.

Junta member Tomas Borge has already spoken about the deficit recorded in Nicaragua between production and consumption, and he has already begun to use the words of the Castroite jargon, pleading for work and discipline.

In other words, in the face of the exhaustion of private initiative and the spontaneous desire to produce, they appeal to discipline, which is based on the whip, submission, forced labor and an oppressive bureaucracy.

Borge and Ortega stressed the rank and file committees and the organization of the masses. It is logical that they should stress their only power base, the one that provides imposition of control over the people's freedom.

Private initiative is curtailed and government control grows. Just as the Junta members declared at the aforementioned ceremony, properties confiscated from the Somoza family are being managed by government organizations. There is no access by the people to ownership of the land, as was promised during the campaign that preceded the seizure of power.

In his plan to promote demagoguery Fidel Castro made childish mistakes in his long speech to the Nicaraguan people in Managua.

Talking about U.S. economic aid to Nicaragua, Castro said that instead of financing the armaments race, the U.S. should help countries in need, such as Nicaragua.

The fact is that according to several authorized sources, the United States now lags behind the Soviet Union in weaponry. It is the USSR that is ahead in the world armaments race at the moment.

Of course Castro would not say that instead of investing in arming itself, the USSR should use its funds to help the nations in need of assistance, such as Nicaragua. However, the mistake of making trite remarks critical of the United States based on the armaments race is also obvious.

Another very clear aspect of this Sandinist celebration was the revelation of clear support by the government of Nicaragua for the subversive activities in El Salvador.

Following the slogan of the extreme leftist forces that are fighting against the government Junta in El Salvador, Daniel Ortega urged all countries to condemn "the murders of farm workers, intellectuals and laborers," and to condemn "the genocide of which the Salvadoran people are the victims."

Pursuing the policy of giving free rein to the leftist forces, he said that Nicaragua was opposed to any intervention in El Salvador which "would open the wounds in Latin America even wider."

For this type of political alignment, "intervention" would be any aid tending to lead to a democratic system that could defend itself from leftist aggression, which would put an end to any freedom in that Central American country.

9661
CSG: 3010

BRIEFS

BOMB EXPLOSIONS--Approximately 10 bombs filled with subversive propaganda exploded yesterday in various parts of the country, including Quiche Department and this capital. It was, perhaps, at the city courthouse where the explosion of two of these bombs caused the worst panic. Many employees and other persons there ran up and down the stairways screaming. The bombs exploded on the 12th and 13th floors. The leaflets scattered by the bombs carried attacks on the government and urged the people not to participate in Sunday's demonstration. Other explosions occurred on 40th Street, Zone 8; 10th Avenue and 13th Street, Zone 1 and on 8th Street, between 10th and 11th Avenues, also in Zone 1. The explosions occurred at different times. An anonymous phone caller to the newspaper EL GRAFICO said that at 14th Street and 10th Avenue downtown there was a package containing a press communique. It turned out to be a bomb. No one was injured as a result of these actions. In Santa Cruz, Quiche Department, a bomb explosion seriously damaged a former police headquarters building. Finally, another bomb exploded in Chichicastenango, also in Quiche. The bombs were apparently part of a nationwide plan of the extreme left. [Text] [PA062355 Guatemala City Radio Mundial in Spanish 1743 GMT 6 Sep 80]

RELIGIOUS GROUPS SUPPORT POPULAR STRUGGLE--Groups of christians and of other Guatemalan religious sectors in exile have issued in Managua a declaration proclaiming their decision to cooperate in the popular struggle against the dictatorship since all democratic roads have been closed to the people and the political parties have been stripped of their leadership. [Excerpt] [PA082244 Havana International Service in Spanish 1800 GMT 8 Sep 80]

CSO: 3010

HONDURAS

PAPER HAILS U.S. SUPPORT OF COUNTRY DURING TRANSITION

San Pedro Sula LA PRENSA in Spanish 28 Aug 80 p 7

[Text] The U.S. ambassador to our country, Mrs Mary Luci Jaramillo, reiterated on the 26th of this month in San Pedro Sula that her government is sympathetic to the transition from a de facto to a constitutional regime, which despite the violence surrounding us, is taking place in a climate of peace that is truly surprising.

The ambassador, who visited this city to inaugurate an Occupational Health and Safety course, said that "because the extremist movements in the Central American region are close by Honduras, they have had an impact on Hondurans' mood," but they have awakened a democratic interest in them, and therefore everyone is helping to maintain the calm that the nation is currently experiencing.

After commenting that in this evolution towards a democratic system everything is proceeding as expected, Dr Jaramillo underscored that what impresses her the most is the way that the entire nation is taking part in furthering the process of return to a constitutional order.

In spelling out the U.S. stand on what is happening in our midst, the ambassador said that "in point of fact, we are supporting Honduras, because we feel that accomplishing a radical change from a de facto to a constitutional government in a democratic and bloodless way is an example to the rest of the world."

In this regard, she added that "my government has tried to spur on this process to the extent that it has been able, to show other countries that believe that changes are possible only through revolution that there are other ways. In a short while," she stressed, "Honduras will be a model that others can imitate."

In addition, the recently appointed undersecretary of state for inter-American affairs contended that even if former California Governor Ronald Reagan should get to the White House, the essence of U.S. foreign policy would be unlikely to change.

"The emphasis on human rights is basic as far as the U.S. Government is concerned, and that will not change," she maintained. There might be modifications in administrative methods and minor changes, but the essence will not be altered radically.

In conclusion, reflecting briefly on her new post in the State Department, she underscored that her ties with our country would grow stronger, not weaker, inasmuch as given her new status, "Hondurans should realize that they will have one more friend in Washington."

"After learning what Honduras is really like, I will always be willing to cooperate with you in whatever way I can," were Dr Jaramillo's final words.

Although the full text of her statements is remarkable, in that it clearly demonstrates the affection that the ambassador has developed for our country in the relatively short time that she was among us, the most noteworthy element, from a political standpoint, is the U.S. Government's clear-cut, express and firm decision to back our move towards democracy, not only as a solution tailored to the specific situation in Honduras, but also as a recipe for Latin American countries in general, which in recent decades have been the victims of ferociously repressive dictatorships.

The experience in Nicaragua, developments in El Salvador and the events in precommunist Cuba have taught Uncle Sam an important lesson: the persistence of oppressive conditions, institutionalized violence, lack of basic freedoms and mass poverty is the fundamental factor in the development of revolutions.

In an objective analysis of actual conditions on the subcontinent we cannot, of course, overlook that the agents of totalitarianism never rest and that they make use of Soviet money, propaganda and arms to set our countries afire, but experience shows all too clearly that extremism cannot flourish where there is freedom, democracy, justice and a serious struggle against underdevelopment.

To cite an old but obvious example: Why has Marxism never been able to expand in Costa Rica, even though the Communist Party is legal and participates regularly in elections?

Simply because these advocates of chaos have nothing to offer the people that democracy has not already given them: education, health care, jobs, social security, civil rights, human rights, in short, a decent, agreeable and ever-improving life.

In contrast, why were the radicals victorious in Nicaragua? Simply because the people could no longer tolerate an authoritarian, dynastic

regime in power for almost half a century and took the risk of backing the people who were struggling against it, without knowing what would happen afterwards.

Honduras unquestionably has an extraordinary opportunity to undertake in peace the political, economic, social and cultural change that the times demand and that the people are justly calling for.

The only thing that we have to do is abolish corruption, create more jobs, abandon sectarianism, combat egoism and excessive ambition, reflect on our homeland with sincerity and devotion and dedicate our finest efforts to it.

Mary Luci Jaramillo tells us that we have a major ally in this undertaking: the people of the United States. Let us, then, do our share and enthusiastically build a nation that we, and those who come after us, can feel proud of because it is an oasis of freedom, democracy and justice in today's troubled world....

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CSO: 3010

JAMAICA

BRIEFS

JAMAICA BANK WORKERS STRIKE--Workers of Jamaica's Central Bank have been on strike for 3 days running. The 500 employees are demanding a wage increase in comparison to their counterparts in the commercial banking sector as well as other fringe benefits. However, efforts are being made by the Minister of Labor to resolve the dispute at a meeting between representatives of the workers union and the bank. The strike has already hampered Jamaica's foreign exchange transactions. [Text] [FL100051 St George's Radio Free Grenada in English 2330 GMT 9 Sep 80]

CSO: 3020

NICARAGUA

SALVADORAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM HAILED

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 17 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Oswaldo Zuniga: "El Salvador--The People Have Shown That Victory Is Near"]

[Text] The fourth general strike of the Salvadoran people ended on 15 August. Without any doubt, this campaign of struggle will provide important experience and great lessons for the Unified Revolutionary Leadership and the people of El Salvador.

Unlike earlier strikes, this last one was strengthened by a major armed mobilization by the masses, better coordination and nationwide scope.

Finally, the people of El Salvador are learning from the blows dealt by the Christian democratic military dictatorship. There is talk now of dozens of guardsmen reported as casualties, while fewer were recorded among the revolutionary forces. We have also seen the desperation of the government leaders' efforts to separate the people of El Salvador from their legitimate leaders. If indeed this strike did not reach 100 percent, the steps taken thereby will be a positive contribution to future revolutionary action.

The deserted streets, empty shops, paralyzed factories, huge patrols, intensive vigilance by helicopters and planes, armed clashes of broad scope, economic sabotage, attacks and assaults upon military sections, seizures of settlements, barricades, militia incursions and, for the first time, the appearance of heavily armed and uniformed combatants, reveal a higher level of struggle.

The people of El Salvador, learning from history, have structured and put to the test in this strike a great mass front, the broadest ever in the history of this brotherly people--this is another of the most important steps forward. The Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) is now a belligerent force in El Salvador and the masses now recognize it as such, just as they recognize the Unified Revolutionary Leadership as their single vanguard.

The Christian Democratic Military Junta, for its part, has shown that it lacks legitimacy and only remains in power thanks to repression and the support of the imperialists.

New forms of struggle are also flourishing in the daily battle in El Salvador. The people's militia forces and the barricades defended by the settlers and combatants have appeared. During this strike, the army found itself forced to defend the capital, leaving other regions, for all practical purposes, in the hands of the revolutionaries, who also controlled some major highways.

At the cost of blood, sacrifice and heroism, the people of El Salvador have again here written one of the finest chapters in the history of their long liberation struggle.

In this new strike, the sectors suffering most were the eternal victims--the defenseless civilian population. The same thing has happened in our country. Everywhere in the world, when it becomes impossible to strike at the revolutionary forces, the repressive armies attack indiscriminately, causing heavy casualties among the civilian population, which they then label a guerrilla force.

The strong and vigorous workers' movement and the presence of the rural workers as basic pillars in this strike constitute another indication that the struggle in El Salvador has a broad popular base which will inevitably lead it to victory.

The international discredit earned by the junta, the brutal repression and the demagogy seem to be reaching their end. The United States, even with all its contributions in the economic, technical, military and media sectors, has been unable to force this heroic people into submission.

El Salvador is today the weakest link in the chain of imperialist domination in Latin America. The Salvadoran revolution will be decisive in changing the balance of forces in favor of peace in Central America, in favor of progress and democracy. Therefore the Latin American peoples can only view the struggle of our Salvadoran brothers with sympathy. The exploited and oppressed peoples of America are seeing their own struggle in that of the Salvadoran people.

And the people of Nicaragua have given and will continue to give their solidarity to the people of El Salvador in their just and heroic struggle.

5157

CSO: 3010

NICARAGUA

TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN HONDURAS CRITICIZED

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 17 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Gregorio Selser: "Power Games in Honduras"]

[Text] On 20 April 1980, elections were held in Honduras. A constituent national assembly was to be elected to draft a new constitution, and, simultaneously, to decide what should be done with the present government, that is whether a civilian should be appointed to replace the three military officers serving as chiefs of state, or if elections for this sole purpose should be immediately convoked.

As a constituent assembly, this body had the ^{ut}ed power to designate the president of the nation by a simple majority of votes, and a good part of the unexpected majority the Liberal Party (PL) won in the elections is explained by the desire of the electorate to have the military replaced in peaceful and legal fashion, by voting. For contrary to all predictions and presumptions, the liberals won 490,000 votes, exceeding the number won by the Nationalist Party (government and conservatives) by 74,000 votes. The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was neatly excluded and a third group, the Innovation and Unity Party (PINU) won 32,000 votes.

The Anointing

The constituent national assembly was made up, then, on the basis of the 20 April results, of 35 liberal deputies, 33 nationalists and 3 from the PINU. The 35 from the PL and the 3 from the PINU made up the majority required to designate a president, and it was erroneously presumed that the leader of the PL, Roberto Suazo Cordova, would be the "annointed." He is a civilian apparently uncontaminated by any collaboration with the military, who were in power uninterruptedly from 1963 on, except for the brief 18-month term of engineer Ramon Ernesto Cruz.

But just a few days before the triumph was known, the first rumors about a compromise between the PL and the military began. Specifically, there were references to secret talks between Suazo Cordova and Gen Policarpo Paz Garcia, acting chief of the government military junta (the other two are

Cols Amilcar Zelaya, chief of police, and Domingo Alvarez, commander of the air force). As a result, it was said, the PL would not object if the constituent assembly decided to retain the armed forces for a determined period, at the end of which and prior to the approval of another constitution, new elections, direct this time, would determine the new president.

In synthesis, it appeared that the triumphant PL, enabled to recover power without any violence and legally (it was known that during an interview between Carter and Paz Garcia in March, the latter promised the American president to respect the decision of the voters), indifferently abandoned that capacity and distorted the will of the majority in the country, agreeing to the plan whereby Paz Garcia and the armed forces would continue in power.

The opposition newspaper PATRIA, in Tegucigalpa, noted the following in its 12 July issue, i.e. 8 days before the formal establishment of the assembly, in connection with the negotiations being pursued to resolve the problem of the transitional government:

"These talks, in which the armed forces are participating like yet another political party, with similar claims against the traditional forces in Honduras, are a vulgar contest for the highest government posts. Except for the PINU, none of the participants have formulated a program or taken into account in any way the great problems and terrible needs of the people of Honduras."

The "Peruvianists"

At a time when the army had warned the PL and the PN that if they did not reach agreement between them about the new cabinet posts, Paz Garcia would resolve the matter on his own with a continuation of the present list, this leader carried out a bold preventive measure against any rebellion in the considerably disturbed military ranks. In fact, in his capacity as commander in chief, "Polo" Paz promulgated a decree on the night of Friday, 1 August, retiring 8 full colonels, 11 lieutenant colonels, a major and 4 captains, as well as 2 generals who in their day were president of Honduras.

In fact, all of those eliminated were regarded as dangerous to the current local power structure, embodied in the junta and the Superior Defense Council, made up of 32 colonels and lieutenants with troop commands.

The existence of a group of "Peruvianist" officers, a term characterizing the nationalist progressivism of the military officers involved in the first part of the Peruvian process in the days of Gen Juan Velasco Alvarado, has always been a kind of specter.

This group was purged first by Melgar Castro, who believing he was "de-communizing" the armed forces himself destroyed the base of his support by

exiling the most capable and enterprising officers, and allowing those most committed to the traditional, conservative order and even linked with the most disturbing aspects of public administration--embezzlement, smuggling and drug trafficking--to continue.

It was a troubled episode connected with this last aspect which gave rise to the removal of Melgar Castro as well. If history tends to repeat itself in some ways, this purge of the high command of the armed forces of Honduras now will leave Paz Garcia exposed to the voracity of--above all or at least--three colonels moving at full speed toward power:

1. Leonidas Torres Arias, head of G-2 (intelligence);
2. Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, commander of the San Pedro Sula region, the most important in the country; and 3. Huber Bodden Caceres, commander of the 11th infantry battalion, regarded as "the CIA's man." We must wait and see.

5157

CSO: 3010

NICARAGUA

GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO ESTABLISH TIES WITH CHINA DEPLORED

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 20 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Jose Antonio Arguello A.: "No to China Is No to a Nonaligned Nicaragua"]

[Text] Not long ago, a motion was brought before the Council of State that it suggest to the Government Junta the establishment of diplomatic relations between Nicaragua and the People's Republic of China. That motion was rejected.

This situation can but cause a certain sadness and disillusionment, in that we had believed ourselves to be a truly nonaligned nation.

Could it be because China is imperialist? Then why do we maintain relations with the United States, and why does the United States maintain relations with Russia?

Could it be because China invaded Vietnam? But did Russia not invade Afghanistan, and yet we have good relations with the Russians?

I talked with a friend, an important member of the Council of State, to learn the true reason underlying the rejection of such an important motion, and the reply was the one I had already anticipated, one that in a few and plain words can be summarized as follows:

"Since Nicaragua has a new and sincere friendship with the Soviet Union, it cannot betray that friendship by establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, which has been historically and continues being the Soviet Union's archenemy."

Can the Russian people have given us so much aid toward reconstruction as to mortgage our friendship to such a point?

It is right that we should have friendly relations with the Soviets, but why can we not also have them with the Chinese, in accordance with the proclamations of our leaders when they say: "We are a nonaligned nation and we have won for ourselves the right to establish diplomatic relations with all the nations of the world."?

It is entirely admissible that we not have friendly relations with countries like Paraguay and other similar ones ruled by tyrants or gorillas, simply because that kind of government offends human dignity. But why not establish relations with one of the most important nations of the world that did not necessarily submit to the Moscow political line, launching its own authentic revolution, and even though the Soviets consider it a "deviationist" from the authentic Marxist-Leninist line? A relationship with the Chinese would not only benefit us in various fields in which they have achieved excellence, but would also prove to the world that we are genuinely not aligned.

It is fitting that we should be grateful to Fidel Castro for the aid he so generously gave to our Revolution; however, it is not a reason why we must refuse to establish relations with those countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Cuba. Or is it that his help must be reciprocated secretly by mortgaging our independence of judgement?

It is proper that we should maintain an important political opening toward the Soviet Union; but it is not an acceptable reason for not establishing one with communist China simply because the two are political enemies.

Where, then, is our nonalignment? Where is our own personality reflected? Has everything then turned out to be but pure and authentic demagoguery?

Is our nonalignment then to be a farce, while in practice we demonstrate that we are aligned? Are we then aligned (like the Cubans) among the nonaligned? Are we then not going to have our own authentically Nicaraguan Revolution, which, characterized by our own initiative and personality, sets an example in Latin America?

When will we learn from Marshal Josif Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, who, with a personality and a courage very similar to those of our "General of Free Men," held in check the direct influence of the Russians and blazed his own trails without any "mecca" to which he must turn and humble himself not even in the least?

Our General Sanguino must be somewhat upset by this attitude on the part of our government, as I am sure all nonaligned Nicaraguans are.

9399

CSN: JRL

NICARAGUA

JUNTA MEMBER CRUZ DISCUSSES CURRENT ISSUES

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 19 Aug 80 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Dr J. Arturo Cruz, member of the Government Junta, by Pedro J. Chamorro B.; date and place not given]

[Text] Dr J. Arturo Cruz, member of the Government Junta, granted LA PRENSA an interesting interview in which he discussed seven current issues of preemptive immediacy: the country's economic situation; Mrs Violeta's letter; prospects of Reagan's winning the election in the United States; the status of the famous "75 million"; the bill that would require all professionals to associate; the future of elections in Nicaragua; and lastly, the proposal to establish relations with China presented to the Council of State last week by Dr Alvaro Jerez.

1. Country's Economic Situation

[Question] How do you view the future? How is the Economic Reactivation Plan proceeding? Is it true that the private sector is to be the object of greater incentives?

[Answer] a) In my personal opinion, Nicaragua's economic future will depend on the attainment of two conditions that are essential to the achievement of a reasonable degree of overall development. The first of these is that we must consolidate a steadfast internal social peace, and the second is that we must carry on an intelligent foreign policy. In this regard, I feel very optimistic because there are clear signs that in our Revolution Christian justice and patriotic pragmatism will prevail.

A few days ago I commented to various industry leaders that during a recent visit I made to Cuba I listened to Commander Fidel Castro Ruz as he said the following: "The golden rule that you Nicaraguans will need to follow is to do nothing that hurts your economy." It is advice that I feel is entirely correct in our revolutionary circumstances, since without sustained economic progress the social projects we have set out for ourselves become even more difficult to realize, as do also those of a preeminently political nature.

b) Nicaragua is in the process of a full-fledged reconstruction. However, the first stage is, as we all know, the most difficult. We are experiencing adjustments in a profound social transformation that has as its extraordinary and fortunate characteristic the fact that the Sandinist Revolution is carrying it out in a climate of individual freedom that permits all the social strata to exercise their right to demonstrate actively; and we have come a long way during this period of pluralistic consolidation. It is nevertheless true, however, that much remains to be done to refine some aspects of the official definitions and guidelines, to render them suitable for official action that will be constantly congruent. Besides which, there must also be on the part of the nonofficial sectors--that is, the political, labor and management groupings--a dedication in full, indeed a genuine devotion, to the revolutionary process. When we will have achieved that degree of perfection of our national unity, we will advance with even greater strides than we are now making toward the goals of the Revolution. Total reactivation of the economy will be a natural result of this process. I am certain we will achieve it thanks to the frank and constructive interchange the government leadership maintains with the leaders of the management organizations and of the mass organizations.

The results of the 1980 Economic Reactivation Plan are reasonably satisfactory, if one takes into account the situational difficulties we are facing. The central government's finances show a higher level of revenue in the first half of this year than in the two previous first half-years. We have started generating modest current account surpluses in our credit balance which are a start toward eventual success in our effort to gradually reduce our excessive dependence, inherited from the previous regime, on foreign financing of our investments.

Production in the farming and livestock sector is gaining momentum.

We have also, during this first half-year, improved our domestic credit controls and mechanisms for accelerating, from now on, the carrying out of projects. The reorganization and strengthening of our national financial system is making significant progress. The renegotiation of our foreign public indebtedness with commercial banks is on the verge of a satisfactory conclusion.

The statistics indicate that inflation has been kept below the maximum tolerable level established by the Plan. We have used foreign exchange to the extent it has been necessary to import food, and we have stimulated domestic food production. The harvests of basic grains have been promising and the government is taking the necessary steps to rationalize the supply situation by way of collection and distribution for the protection of the public as regards food supplies and prices.

We are having a hard time in the foreign sector and harder times are ahead in which, to avoid serious foreign exchange shortages, we are going to have to exercise even greater austerity in our imports. Above all else, we are

going to have to increase production decisively to import less and export more. The financing we are able to get in support of our balance of payments is but a palliative, not a remedy for our foreign imbalance.

c) It is in our national interest to maintain incentives in the private sector as an inducement to enthusiastic investment and production. A mixed economic system has been established and I would also say that the state productive sector has already been brought into conformity with it. It is therefore in the state's own interest to continue facilitating to all sectors the guarantees they need to develop innovatively, efficiently and vigorously. In the final analysis, our primary concern is that there be the effective state leadership needed to optimize production and channel all surpluses toward the national well-being, which results in the peoples' well-being.

2. Mrs Violeta's Letter

[Question] A copy of that letter was addressed to you, and it has been published as a response to the campaign being waged against LA PRENSA, which has reached a saturation point. "It has now gone beyond that limit," said Mrs Violeta. What do you think of the campaign referred to in her letter?

[Answer] Mrs Violeta's letter has merited the attention of the Junta, in which she enjoys the esteem and respect of all its members. Within the system of freedoms that all we Nicaraguans are enjoying, that great lady of the Nicaraguan Revolution has protested publicly against what she deems to be a campaign against LA PRENSA, which in my opinion is occurring within that same climate of freedom. I of course understand the solidarity felt by the widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal with the newspaper that served as a forum from which this illustrious and heroic founding father of our nation preached the freedom of the Nicaraguan people, a cause to which he frequently sacrificed his own freedom and finally gave his life.

3. Foreign Politics

[Question] What is your view of the possibilities that Reagan may become president of the United States?

[Answer] The possibilities seem very real at this point that Gov Ronald Reagan may become president of the United States.

Current polls, however, could result invalid in November, in that the Democrats could win if they all decidedly supported President Carter's reelection campaign, appealing to the electorate to vote for the party's philosophy rather than in accordance with the candidate's popularity standing.

Ironically, not only is the model of our Nicaraguan Revolution the one most advantageous to the political interests of the United States itself in a Latin America that day by day becomes more revolutionary, but our Revolution is also certain to be found acceptable by the majority of Americans as they gradually come to learn more about it.

It is to be supposed that if Mr Reagan is elected he will act rationally toward Nicaragua. It is also important that we Nicaraguans remain cognizant of that potential receptivity on the part of the Americans and do nothing to jeopardize it gratuitously.

4. Foreign Aid

[Question] What has happened regarding those \$75 millions? Have they been blocked? Why?

[Answer] In the first place, you will recall that the United States has already advanced us \$15 million.

In the second place, we are currently engaged in talks with the American Embassy, refining a few points, in preparation for the signing of the agreement.

Upon signature of the agreement, we are to receive \$40 million more, and the rest subsequently.

5. Bill Requiring All Professionals To Associate

[Question] Do you not think this bill is contrary to the Basic Law on Freedom of Association? Do you not think it is dangerous for the state to exercise control over all members of the professions? Is this bill not at variance with the democratic principles of a pluralistic society?

[Answer] This bill is an initiative that had its genesis within the Council of State, not the Junta.

I have not yet been able to familiarize myself with it sufficiently to analyze the bill, which may have positive aspects as well as conflictive ones. I therefore cannot properly express an opinion on it at this time. However, I do wish to state that I am certain it will be studied carefully to avoid unnecessary traumas among the professionals; such traumas could be deadly, since as we all know--and I have said it many times publicly-- the critical variable in our nation's economic reactivation is the qualified human factor.

6. The Elections

[Question] Could you tell us something about the future of the elections and whether it is true that they will not be the kind held in Costa Rica and the United States?

[Answer] The leaders of our revolutionary vanguard have said that suffrage is a right that the people have won for themselves. No one is trying to evade the fulfillment of that obligation. The profound sense of honor of the Revolution is to be trusted.

The form of elections that is to be used will have to be modeled on the principles and practices of a genuine democracy.

I believe that when this question is posed to any public official like myself who under normal conditions would have had to be elected by direct popular vote, his or her answer, to be complete, must include recognition of the fact that he or she occupies that position as the result of a state of emergency and that, like all emergencies, it is of a transitory nature.

Taking into account all these considerations, the Nicaraguan people should feel assured that the day is not far off when the Revolution will, by way of elections, consult them so that they can express freely who they wish their leaders to be and what kind of mandate they wish to confer upon those leaders.

7. Relations With China

[Questions] What is your view of the Council of State's refusal to establish relations with China?

[Answer] I fully respect the Council of State's decision to reject the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China proposed by Dr Alvaro Jerez. Nevertheless, I do not hesitate to state my personal opinion that a timely reevaluation of this important issue is in the national interest.

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CSO: 3010

NICARAGUA

COMMANDER PASTORA DISCUSSES ACHIEVEMENTS OF REVOLUTION

Havana VERDE OLIVO in Spanish 3 Aug 80 p 19

[Report on an interview with Commander Eden Pastora by Javier Rodriguez, PL special correspondent; date and place not given]

[Text] The quantitative and qualitative leap made by the Sandinist Peoples Militias on a par with the development of our heroic Sandinist Peoples Army allows us to state that we are capable of confronting any internal or external aggression against our revolution and sovereignty.

The man speaking to Prensa Latina is one of the best known Nicaraguan guerrilla commanders.

The mission which he led during the popular insurrection against the Anastasio Somoza tyranny shook the regime and also made many tremble with excitement. We are speaking of brigade commander Eden Pastora, "Commander Zero" of the taking of the National Palace in Managua in 1978.

On that day the daring Sandinist commander took as hostages within the official facilities almost 3,500 people, among them many officials, legislators of the Somozist Parliament and even some relatives of the dictator. This forced Somoza to free dozens of political prisoners who were members of the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front].

Now Pastora is viceminister of Defense in the Government of National Reconstruction and commands the now strong Sandinist Peoples Militias. In an interview he speaks with enthusiasm about the people's own defense organization.

"The level of revolutionary awareness and political development among our people is high. The enthusiasm with which they have massively joined the militias both in the urban and rural areas has enabled us to gauge this. We already have tens of thousands of militiamen and our goal will be 200,000 Nicaraguans incorporated into this force and ready to defend their revolution."

A short pause and he continues:

"The Peoples Militias are the continuation of the army of Sandino and of the combatants in the insurrection against Somoza that forced the National Guard to flee. It is our workers and peasants who train themselves militarily as an expression of their support of the revolution and their love of the fatherland."

For the guerrilla commander, internal counterrevolution is not a serious threat to the survival of the revolutionary process and the isolated outbreaks that have cropped up until now in the country have been rapidly crushed by the people.

"The greatest danger that Nicaragua would have to face would be foreign military intervention, be it from the imperialist armed forces or from Latin American armies which are members of reactionary military organizations. It is precisely because of this that arms are given to the people because one should never discount the possibility of a desperate attack by the ultrarightist forces or an adventurist attack. Anyway, if that were to happen here, the results would be the same as when Sandino defeated the Yankee interventionists."

Another role that Pastora assigns to the Peoples Militias is that of persuading a potential enemy because the realization that a whole people is on a war footing for the defense of its achievements will cause the false illusions to disappear in the minds of some who yearn for the return of their lost privileges.

In that respect he recalled the important work done by the militiamen in protecting the tens of thousands of literacy workers who are waging a successful battle against ignorance in the most isolated regions of that Central American nation and the vigilance over public property, work places and social facilities.

The conversation now turns to an analysis of the achievements obtained by Nicaragua in its first year of revolution:

"We have great quantities of marine resources. We have coffee, cotton, sugarcane and cattle. We are the granary Central America. We possess great resources in our mines, all the land is of first quality and we can count on a working people, which is the greatest treasure."

He thinks for a moment about a question. Yes, the commander misses his life as a guerrilla. According to his own words, he yearns for his life as a clandestine fighter. His last words refer to that topic:

"And I miss it most when I hear about the sufferings of other people, how students are killed in sister nations, how peasants are burned alive inside a seized embassy, how they kill a priest who was acting according to the mandates of the new Christ. At those moments I yearn for my rifle of the insurrection but I also reaffirm my trust in the desire for liberty among the Latin American peoples."

PSD HEAD RESPONDS TO PASTORA'S STATEMENT ON ELECTIONS

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 20 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] With reference to certain statements by Commander Eden Pastora on the issue of the elections, Mr Wilfredo Montalvan, secretary general of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], has responded with an open letter, which we publish below.

Commander Eden Pastora
National Head of the MPS [Sandinist Popular Militias]
Managua

My dear Eden:

It was with utmost surprise that I read your statement to the AGENCIA NUEVA NICARAGUA in which you say you are not in agreement with the holding of elections "at this very moment."

No one has demanded elections "at this very moment."

We are fully in agreement that the National Reconstruction Plan is the main task to which we Nicaraguans are all committed, but part of this Plan consists of a Political Reconstruction that can only begin to get under way when our people will have come to know the exact dates set for free, periodic and secret elections throughout the country.

Entirely on the contrary to what you state, those of us who are demanding free elections are not opposed to economic reactivation, but we are firmly convinced that setting the reference dates will contribute to creating the climate of confidence and credibility that is needed so that everyone can work in peace and tranquility, without uncertainty as to the future.

I am surprised that you refer to those who demand free elections as demagogues; from which it seems that you have already forgotten that we took part together in the 22 January 1967 Movement, the purpose of which was precisely to demand elections, and for the sake of which we suffered imprisonment and torture, and hundreds of our companions were cut down, massacred by Somozist bullets on Avenida Sandino for demanding that right which many of us Nicaraguans are demanding again today.

I am also surprised that you have expressed yourself in this way; for, I had the pleasure of seeing and hearing you interviewed by the Costa Rican television network just a few moments before the start of our victorious march on Managua on 19 July 1979. In that interview, you asserted that your greatest aspiration was "to some day see free elections take place in Nicaragua like those held periodically in Costa Rica."

Now then, Eden: Who are the demagogues? Those who yesterday, when they were not in power, said one thing, and today another, or those of us who, faithful to our principles, continue struggling to bring to reality the great aspirations of the Nicaraguans?

Fraternally,

[signed] Wilfredo Montalvan

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CSO: 3010

PAPER DEFENDS GOVERNMENT'S NEW ELECTION LAW

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 26 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] In order for a revolution to take root and endure, it must be the result of a democratic process. Those that are imposed do not grow roots. We are, therefore, glad that the Sandinist Front proclaimed on the 23rd that a participatory democracy with elections would be one of the revolution's constitutional structures, a democracy of the people, not a statist one, a republican not a dictatorial democracy.

The ambition of all true democrats and progressive-minded persons in Nicaragua and the Americas is for the people "to participate in political, economic, social and cultural affairs" because "the more the people take part in these areas, the more democratic the system is," because democracy is economic as well as political and because its goal is to gradually do away with "social inequalities," and "for workers and peasant farmers to raise their standards of living." Furthermore, as the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front] pronouncement says, this participation ought to be broadened so that "the people influence and determine their government," and in addition democracy means "participation by the workers in the management of factories, farms, cooperatives and cultural centers." (Participation is the opposite of exclusion, the opposite of relinquishing.)

Participatory democracy has been the democratic ideal of LA PRENSA, which has upheld and defended this concept editorially since the heroic times of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. A participatory democracy entails pluralism and freedom of expression and opinion. Or, as the front's pronouncement says, "it reaffirms constructive criticism as the only fruitful criticism, and dissent and pluralism as essential components of Sandinist democracy."

Finally, the front puts the finishing touches on its definition of democracy by citing another essential part of it: elections, that irreplaceable form of participation by the people in the selection of their leaders and government.

Elections are decisive in the tradition of the Americas. Democracy cannot survive if authority, any authority, is allowed to remain outside the voting process and the will of the people. Without these controls and without changes, power immediately becomes entrenched and turns absolute and dictatorial. We see the emergence of irreplaceable men, "strong men," the predestined individuals who break down the democratic edifice from its foundations, destroying its two pillars of support: freedom and equality.

The ability to change governments through elections is the only known political antidote to the temptations of power. And those who have fought against one dictatorship must now erect, as a final element in the reconstruction process, legal structures so that the evil that we have just felled does not raise its head again.

"In 1984," the front says, "we must begin the electoral process through which the Nicaraguan people will decide the government that will continue building the new Nicaragua."

One can agree or disagree with the time period stipulated. We can debate the step-by-step process of participation, which must be in keeping with actual conditions here. But now that democratic structures have been proclaimed as part and parcel of the revolutionary process, the first thing that must be abolished is the aggressive language, the language of war not peace, the hostile and haughty language that unjustifiably creates enemies and misunderstandings both here and abroad.

Democracy is impossible with this separatist and unconciliatory language. Democracy means dialog.

If democracy has been proclaimed, let's speak its language. We cannot build a democracy with the language of a dictatorship.

8743

CSO: 3010

ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAST CRITICIZED

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 27 Aug 80 pp 3, 5

[Text] Revolutionary Government and Counterrevolution.

Our people's revolutionary struggle has historic grounds and sufficient legitimacy to invalidate any political claim by sectors responsible for our backwardness and exploitation.

The struggle of the people's movement was not just a rebellion to question a government. The purpose of the struggle by the people's movement was to construct a new Revolutionary Sandinist Government, a struggle to dislodge and destroy the longstanding instrument of domination by the oligarchs and the partners of transnational capital.

Our struggle never came down to replacing the men of that government. The vanguard always called for the destruction of the exploitative government so that we could pave our way towards social progress. This social force, with the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front] in the vanguard, challenged the oppressor government with a revolutionary program to transform both social conditions and ideas. Thus emerged a new concept of government, of its makeup, of the procedures for running it and of the qualifications of men to administer it. The vanguard did not deceive the people. Today, revolutionary interests and reactionary interests are clearly defined in the arena of the political struggle. An organized people, their political development, the revolutionary program and the nature of its actions are the indispensable factors in a new, revolutionary and effective political movement, and this is what is prompting the minority that has been displaced from power to question the process. "The past" is now questioning the new building process.

The political struggle being waged is not just a struggle of political programs among "political parties," as the MDN [Nicaraguan Democratic Movement], PSC [Social Christian Party], PCD [Democratic Conservative Party] and the PSD [Social Democratic Party] would have us believe. Our people know that the struggle in the economic and political spheres is between two contradictory and distinct approaches to social progress

and definitive liberation: that of the progressive forces and that of the sectors which assert that "the past was always better."

Our working people are today reminding these gentlemen of that past. Our people are saying: "They promised us everything at each election, but we have nothing." They "offered" the people a package of promises; the people did not have power.

Thus there is a historical explanation for why the radical nature of this revolution frightens the MDN, PSD, PSC, PCD and the other corporations. These sectors deceived the people for decades, either by legitimizing their class brother Somoza in power or by promising government programs that they could not carry out because it would have meant ceasing to exploit the people, which would have entailed their liquidation as a class. They thus supplanted action by the people, denied them their place in history, shattered their organization and values and expropriated them. That is why all of the people's convictions are becoming realities, because they are in power. This people believed in the historic possibility of constructing a people's government and undertook the revolution. This people believes in the new society and the new man and is building them. The people believed in the literacy campaign and carried it out. The people are convinced of the need to defend the revolution in order to continue moving forward and are organizing in militias, in an army, are generating unity to be victorious. The people believe in their vanguard because it has grasped and guided their ambitions and interests.

The vanguard has no commitments to the past and it is honest about the limitations that the former regime bequeathed us. It explains them to the people and makes no false promises. The FSLN is the vanguard because it does not propose "third ways" for overcoming our backwardness and exploitation. Those who do want only to disguise exploitation, by seeking one that has no stench.

While the vanguard busies itself with clarifying and explaining the new tasks of the revolution that aim at strengthening the working people, the political groups of the past promise the paradise and the "salvation" of "democracy," which for many long years they expropriated from the people. The battle lines are clearly drawn. The forces of the revolution are engaged in revolutionary tasks to meet the needs of the present and to build the material base of the future, while the reactionary sectors are still worried about their "democracy" and their profits.

The revolution is strong, gentlemen; it cannot be expropriated.

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CSO: 3010

VIOLETA CHAMORRO DEFENDS PAPER AGAINST REGIME ATTACK

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 12 Aug 80 pp 1,12

[Text] Sunday, 10 August 1980.

Open Letter

Commander Daniel Ortega S.

Member of the JGRN [National Reconstruction Government Junta] and of the National Directorate of the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front]
Managua

Dear Daniel:

When I saw today, Sunday, 10 August, the program "Meet the People" which was televised in the Subtiava de Leon quarter, I was once again able to observe the unjust campaign which you are waging against the newspaper LA PRENSA--a campaign which has gone far enough.

As a member of LA PRENSA's board of directors, and completely in accord with its policies, I need only tell you that I disagree with your opinion of the newspaper LA PRENSA.

The people of Nicaragua and international opinion are witnesses to the fact that LA PRENSA has always wanted the best for its people, both before and after the cowardly assassination of my husband Pedro Joaquin by Somoza, and the destruction of the newspaper, and that is why the people continue to prefer it. Just as you say, the people are the best judge.

I want to tell you that those who are now working at LA PRENSA are honest people and true Nicaraguan patriots and do not wish our people any harm; quite the contrary, LA PRENSA will continue as long as it can to be the guide and mentor of our people, highly informative and independent, and not for the purpose of profit, as we have shown by risking all on several occasions.

You are well aware, as are the other members of the Junta and several ministers, that when I was working with you for our people, I saw proof that several newsmen, who at that time were employees of LA PRENSA and who are now working for other newspapers were corrupt. What does this mean?... Well, it means that they regularly received money from the Somoza government, and it was not just five cordobas but anywhere from 5 thousand to 100 thousand cordobas. They rendered those "publicity services" up to 3 months before my husband was killed. Fortunately, none of them is still working for LA PRENSA.

I say that the Nicaraguan people and revolutionary justice should judge them; perhaps you will find in them the real counterrevolutionaries which you so diligently are trying to find in LA PRENSA.

Respectfully,

Violeta B. De Chamorro

cc: Members of the Government Junta

Lr Arturo Cruz, Dr Rafael Cordova, Dr Moises Hassan, Dr Sergio Ramirez
Emilio Baltodano, comptroller of the republic
Dr Ernesto Castillo, minister of justice
Dr Roberto Arguello Hurtado, president of the Supreme Court of Justice

National Directorate of the FSLN:

Commander: Tomas Borge M.
Commander Bayardo Arce C.
Commander: Carlos Nunez T.
Commander: Luis Carrion
Commander: Humberto Ortega S.
Commander: Victor Tirado L.
Commander: Jaime Wheelock R.
Commander: Henry Ruiz

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CSO: 3010

'LA PRENSA' ATTACKED FOR MISLEADING ARTICLE

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 27 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] "Brother" Perez and LA PRENSA

It strikes no one as strange that although every so often LA PRENSA describes its "mistakes" as accidental and involuntary and even masquerades as a "scapegoat," it is waging an ongoing campaign of diversionism and sabotage against the revolution in its daily editions.

We often see how it doctors the news (in conformity with the stands of the reactionary parties) in a bid to trigger artificial confrontations between the revolution and patriotic businessmen or between the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front] and the church, or to strike at the economic recovery program or to detract from the prestige of revolutionary institutions and to deny the vanguard role of the FSLN in the revolutionary process.

We find a typical example of how it expresses its intentions in the way in which it highlighted the news item about the "El Alba Home." In its 12 August edition it published a five-column news story under the headline: "Police Close Down Children's Home."

The first paragraph of the story explains that the Sandinist Police and State Security Forces "occupied and closed down" the "El Alba" Temporary Home, which was run by "Brother" Manuel Salvador Perez, Jose Hidalgo, a Salvadoran, and Denis Gonzalez.

The story obviously intended, by its tone, to equate the methods and objectives of the dictatorship's repressive forces with the revolutionary forces' firm and determined defense of our children and the values of our people. This was a good opportunity for LA PRENSA to speak ill of the Sandinist Police and to portray it as a repressive body that goes around arbitrarily closing down "children's homes," in this case, in fact, a religious "home." In other words, resorting to alarmism, the paper wanted to create the conditions for an artificial conflict between the revolution and the church.

But the distortion of the facts did not get very far. In a matter of days the revolution demonstrated that there were criminal designs behind the false priestly vestments of sexual deviate Manuel Salvador Perez, thus confirming LA PRENSA's reactionary and provocative intentions. It did them no good to question the police's charges against "Brother" Perez, in a crass attempt to detract from the legitimacy of this revolutionary organization, because the evidence is overwhelming. Everything has now been unmasked, and the defenders of the deviate Perez, those who hypocritically wanted to make us believe that the government was harming the children and mothers who had been deceived by the impostor, are keeping their mouths shut. We have not yet read in LA PRENSA the upshot of the "El Alba Home" incident, nor do we think that it is going to publish anything about it, because it is of no concern to the paper to acknowledge that "Brother" Perez is a sexual deviate, an impostor, and that the mass organizations and the Interior Ministry's forces acted in legitimate defense of our people and dealt a harsh blow to the reactionaries. The paper would rather remain silent and leave some of its readers with the notion that the revolution acted arbitrarily in this case.

But the people are not fooled, and LA PRENSA's ploy has been completely unmasked.

8743

CSO: 3010

NICARAGUA

IMPORTANCE OF FIRM CHRISTIAN-REVOLUTIONARY TIES HIGHLIGHTED

Managua EL NUEVO DIARIO in Spanish 21 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by the CEPA [Agricultural Education and Promotion Center]
Team: "Christians, Religious Rallies and Their Political Impact"]

The relationship between religion and politics, as well as the dividing line between them, has often been problematic, inasmuch as man is both religious and political.

The ruling classes in many of Latin America's dictatorships have accused church sectors that identify with the people of "getting involved in politics." On our continent, particularly in Central America, hundreds and thousands of Christians (priests, members of religious orders and lay persons) have sealed their true commitment to the poor with their own blood. These Christians, the priests, brothers and nuns in particular, have been accused of "getting involved in politics" for defending the most elementary rights of the poor, such as the right to life, to work and to freedom of expression. There have also been, however, numerous "military chaplains" (serving oppressive regimes) who justified an essentially unjust, criminal and corrupt order, such as the Somoza dictatorship and other military regimes on our continent.

The exploitative military governments never accused these "chaplains" of "getting involved in politics." There were instances of priests holding several posts in a regime of oppression and death...and let us remember Father Leon Pallais. No bishop asked him to resign from his posts.

The Catholic Church's official stand has been, in principle, one of neutrality towards the various political forces, but it is very difficult, practically impossible, to remain neutral in the midst of a dynamic social process in which competing forces are constantly shaping society. What is clear in the stand reflected in church documents is that it cannot link up unconditionally with any political system.

Neutrality? If the crimes of an oppressive regime are not denounced, there is complicity, not neutrality. If noble efforts such as the Great National Literacy Crusade are not supported, this means backwardness and counteraction against the Nicaraguan Revolution, not neutrality. Support for them means being on the side of the illiterate, exploited people.

We feel that the problem of the dividing line between religion and politics and the use of religion for political purposes necessarily entails an assessment of the goals towards which religious values are being channeled.

For example, "getting involved" in politics to run for a legislative seat held by one of many vote-seeking parties or to maintain a government post by justifying a despotic and anti-people's government, is not the same as involvement in a situation like Nicaragua's, in the construction of a new homeland, in taking up a government post to serve the people in a time of economic crisis.

There is a fundamental difference between a government position held by a priest in the Nicaraguan Revolution today (for example, Father Escoto in the Foreign Ministry, who is inspiring international confidence in our people's revolution so that Nicaragua can achieve greater world support and solidarity) and a post held by a priest as an official of the Somoza government, thus legitimizing a sinful situation to get rich, acquire power and gain privileges.

In short, the involvement of priests in politics cannot be judged in the abstract. We have to ask whom the person in the post is serving: himself and an exploitative minority, or the traditionally underprivileged and exploited masses.

We can say the same thing about mass religious demonstrations. It is an undeniable and objective fact that churches and their leaders (especially the Catholic Church) have a great ability to rally the people and to lend prestige to and legitimize our revolution around the world. Moreover, they can spur Christians towards more decisive involvement in the building of the New Nicaragua. The use of this ability cannot be neutral. It can be used either to defend the people and their interests, or to bring together, support and protect privileged minorities that seek to subjugate our revolutionary process through a system of "bourgeois democracy" in which the people have nothing else to say and decide after the solemn and discredited rite of "elections," which a number of parties are so insistently calling for.

We Nicaraguan Christians have a very great responsibility in consolidating our revolution and Latin America's revolution too. If we succeed in showing the world that Christians are harmoniously and

resolutely taking part not only in an insurrection but in a reconstruction as well, we will be giving a decisive push to the liberation of Latin American peoples, and to Christians this means helping to reduce ignorance, exploitation, hunger, poverty, unsanitary conditions, torture and murder.

The lesson of what has happened in El Salvador and Guatemala is clear: the longer exploitative groups dominate, the more pain and death for the people. If we Nicaraguan Christians furnish clear-cut evidence of conscious and resolute involvement in a revolution that is gradually but steadfastly creating new living conditions for the masses, we will be giving a significant push to the revolutionary involvement of Christians in the liberation struggles in their respective countries, and this would give a definitive boost to the Latin American revolution, as "Che" Guevara proclaimed it more than 15 years ago.

This is a very serious responsibility. To a large extent it is up to us Nicaraguans to encourage Christians to get resolutely involved in the struggle for justice in their countries and to ward off much pain, exploitation and especially loss of life for all of our Latin American brothers. This responsibility belongs to our entire people, but especially to us Christians and to those who possess authority in Christian churches.

We have to view our process with new eyes, with a new look, not through the lenses of old anticommunist prejudices stemming from the experiences in Eastern Europe, which have nothing to do with Nicaragua.

We are witnessing today an intense ideological debate on the type of democracy that we are going to create in this country and on the role of churches and Christians in the current revolutionary process.

In this regard, we would like to make a number of observations regarding the solemn festivities being readied in Masaya for the coronation of Our Lady of the Assumption on 17 August.

We feel that celebrations such as these, staged at one of our country's most combative spots (Masaya-Monimbo) and with invitations to well-known figures such as President Carazo, represent support for bourgeois electoral democracy, by forming a long caravan of "well-to-do Christians" (who have cars and can afford gasoline to travel from Costa Rica to Nicaragua) and by causing a major publicity flourish. They could well serve as a platform for a series of parties and minor groups that are questioning our revolution and calling it undemocratic because it is not at the moment organizing the traditional electoral machinery.

We feel that it is extremely dangerous for events such as the coronation of a revered image of the Virgin Mary to be turned into a sounding board for irresponsible attacks on our Nicaraguan Revolution.

Our religious leaders are ill-advised to consciously or unconsciously play into the hands of these tiny groups, which represent not the general interests of the people but the interests of the minorities who still have some privileges to lose.

If they appear to be giving their blessing to these tiny groups, it could confuse a segment of the people and, furthermore, shrink the social base of our religious leaders, because at this point the Nicaraguan people can see quite clearly who is on their side and who is not. We think that religious leaders have a very serious responsibility to see to it that Christians play as evangelical a role as possible in the building of the New Nicaragua.

In addition, the people worship the Gospel, the Christian faith and Mary the mother of the poor and the bearer of freedom, and thus it would be doubly treasonous to use this religious celebration as a sounding board for demands and interests that are not the people's. We say that it is doubly treasonous because Christian values and the Gospel are aimed primarily at the poor.

There has always been love and devotion for the Virgin Mary in Nicaragua and Latin America because our peoples have sought in her comfort from their afflictions and salvation and liberation from their specific problems. We cannot forget that the Virgin Mary was the banner of many independence struggles in Latin America, in Mexico in particular. The simple people of Nicaragua have always viewed Mary as a champion of liberation, and we cannot allow her to be used as a pretext for international commotion by those who are trying to preserve social inequality intact.

The relationship between faith and revolution, the conscious, resolute and discriminating involvement of Christians in this process is a strategic problem for the Nicaraguan and Latin American revolution. This is why many reactionaries are still striving to portray the Sandinist Revolution and the Christian faith as at odds. Our revolutionary actions are demonstrating the opposite.

We must not allow the propaganda and ploys of local reactionaries to hinder the harmonious incorporation of Christians into the revolution. We must not allow occasions such as the coronation of the Virgin at Monimbo to be used to detract from our revolution's prestige and to diminish international support for Nicaragua, as well as to isolate Christians from a process that by eliminating the causes of widespread hunger, thirst, disease, nakedness and sadness, is shaping a historical situation that draws nearer to the Kingdom of God. Managua, 15 August 1980, Feast of the Assumption.

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CSO: 3010

NICARAGUA

BAPTIST PASTOR HAILS REVOLUTION'S CHRISTIAN TIES

Managua EL NUEVO DIARIO in Spanish 17 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Baptist Pastor Jose Miguel Torres; "The Sandinist Revolution and Religious Worship"]

[Text] We Christians must rejoice when we see signs and indications of new times. We had always said--and perhaps it did happen elsewhere -- that a new social change would bring with it persecution of the Christian faith, of the church and of the faithful.

During his recent visit on a study of our CDS's [Sandinist Defense Committees] in the San Judas district, Prof Michael Lowi of the University of Paris noted the vast number of Christians who, motivated by the District Church Communities, made up the large majority of the mass organizations down to their lowest echelons of expression of the people's power, and said that "the change in the relationships within the productive structure has not done away with religion as a superstructural institution. Rather, it has produced a change in the content of the latter."

As we approached the present season of religious feasts in Nicaragua, Commander Tomas Borge urged the public not to let liquor-consumption advertising degrade the meaning of religious feasts down to the level of vices and counterrevolutionary corruption.

Unfortunately, these moralizing initiatives at our feast times are not always accompanied by a Catholic or Protestant pastoral designed to serve as a soundboard for the appeals from the state.

It is sad to see that in places like Chile, the Virgin Mary Queen of the Heavens is at the same time General of the Armed Forces, thus legitimizing the repressions and massacres being suffered by the people; and the church has, over the many years, covered up such maneuvers.

In our Nicaraguan case, even though the state is laic and secular, the leaders of our revolution have always shown respect for the religious nature of our people and, what is more, have made every effort to ensure that our religious festivities do not become instruments of dirty or illegal business, or destroyers of morality.

In the Sandinist Revolution, moreover, the specific actions of its leaders have not stopped there. They have even attended masses and religious ceremonies, taken part in processions like that of Santo Domingo on 1 January, and when the case warranted it, as did the assassination of the well-remembered Archbishop Monsignor Romero, the Sandinist Front has convoked the entire population to a solemn outdoor mass.

Recently, the newspapers carried the story of a dinner attended by Christian businessmen, several national political leaders, representatives of private enterprise, intellectuals and commanders of the Revolution. This way of evangelization is very characteristic of American Protestant churches and, under auspices of World Vision, an international missionary organization, has been adopted in various countries. And although this dinner of the revolutionary commanders and businessmen gave rise to certain purist interpretations, the fact is that Christ himself did on some occasions dine with rich men and sinners. But in our case, what this brought out was the openness of the revolutionary leaders, even towards charismatic Christian sects and toward Protestant Christians devoted to the most diverse of Evangelization criteria.

Perhaps the more important thing would have been to get those Christian businessmen, who even claimed they had prayed for and asked God's blessing on our people and our Revolution, who recognized the validities of our struggle for justice and equality, to convey their testimony, through the extensive chains of the mass media, to the United States, to counter there the aggressive campaign of disparagement, isolation and lies with which some American transnationals and reactionary power groups are trying to smear the example and the hopes that our Sandinist Revolution have kindled.

We can confidently say that our Revolution is in no way antireligious and that at no time has there been the least sign of it. There has been hardly a single event, religious retreat, congress, seminar, lecture, religious meeting, whether Catholic or Protestant, to which the leaders of the Revolution or the officials of some government body have not been invited to contribute with an analysis of the situation, or to orient in some way the frame of reference for Christians. The few cases of friction that have occurred between church and state have not been questions of faith or of the Christian way of life, but rather misunderstandings revolving around the nature of the government. But in these cases, the church knows, as did its Lord, that its mission is to be the suffering servant of society, so that by dint of the love attested in the humility of the second mile, the

Gospel will be believed. The attitude of the church, according to Jesus Christ, is not to seek to be saluted in public nor to occupy front row seats, but rather to carry the washbasin and towel and to bathe the people's feet. The power of God will always be manifested in the Cross, in weakness and in poverty.

Let us hope our experience as Christians in the Nicaraguan Revolution will be a workshop of lasting apprenticeship, such that our celebrations of feasts will not become mere folkloric attractions because of a failure on our part to endow them with deeply meaningful content, nor be turned into instrumentalities, seeking thereby to make of them expressions of power. The meaning of the Gospel must be preserved, or we will be bringing about a loss of faith and a loss of confidence in our authenticity.

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C80: 3010

ST KITTS-NEVIS

BRIEFS

ST KITTS BAGASSE STUDY--St Kitts-Nevis Premier Dr Kennedy Simmonds last night said that his government would look at the feasibility of using bagasse to provide electricity for the twin island state. Special equipment would be needed to feed this energy into the national grid. [FL262051 St George's Radio Free Grenada in English 2030 GMT 26 Aug 80]

CSO: 3020

ST LUCIA

BRIEFS

HURRICANE AID REPORTED--St Lucia's Prime Minister Allan Louisy went before the nation over the weekend to brief St Lucians on efforts in reconstructing the island following the ravages of hurricane Allen. He announced that more relief supplies and financial assistance have been coming in to St Lucia. He said Australia has donated \$29,000 for the purchase of food and building materials, Switzerland \$15,000 and Japan \$10,000. He also announced that the Italian Government has promised to give a package of \$15,000. [FL100051 St George's Radio Free Grenada in English 2330 GMT 9 Sep 80]

CSO: 3020

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

BRIEFS

TOBAGO AFFAIRS BILL REJECTION--The opposition Democratic Action Congress--the DAC--of Trinidad and Tobago has rejected a parliamentary bill calling for the establishment of a 16-member body to handle the affairs of the neighboring island of Tobago. The DAC said the bill fell short of the internal self-government which the DAC is demanding. The bill, which was presented to the House of Representatives on September 5th, allows for the establishment of a body with responsibilities for the implementation of economic policies for Tobago and other government policies including the collection of revenue, the granting of financial assistance to village councils and the maintenance of fishing facilities. [FL110056 St George's Radio Free Grenada in English 2330 GMT 10 Sep 80]

CSO: 3020

MARACAIBO OIL DEPOSIT DISCOVERED

Caracas EL NACIONAL in Spanish 21 Aug 80 p D-18

[Article by Argenis Bravo]

[Text] Maracaibo, 20 Aug (Special)--LAGOVEN has discovered 476 million barrels of oil in the Lake Maracaibo basin and is now pursuing its explorations in search of light crudes.

This information was provided by an authorized spokesman for the above enterprise, a subsidiary of the PDVSA [Venezuelan Petroleum, Inc], upon being consulted on the new programs being carried out by LAGOVEN in its traditional areas as well as its newly added ones such as the so-called "Urdaneta Corridor."

The spokesman indicated that LAGOVEN is currently carrying on exploratory work in the Lake Maracaibo basin in search of light crudes.

Exploratory work is being conducted especially in the Cretaceous bed, and particularly the Cretaceous limestones, which are the basin's deepest oil-bearing rocks.

"That exploration," said the spokesman, "in the decade of the 1970's, could be termed 'the exploration of the Cretaceous,' in that all activity has been centered on the drilling of deep wells."

As a new aspect, he mentioned that in 1978 the PDVSA established the basic exploratory planning areas, and that LAGOVEN had immediately begun wildcat drilling activity in the designated new areas, such as the Urdaneta Corridor, southwest of the Lake (both in the Lake Maracaibo region) and Perija.

Under this new policy, the company was given more than 1 million hectares of additional area to be explored, which is equivalent to 90 percent of Lake Maracaibo's area, thus increasing substantially the extent of LAGOVEN's exploratory operations.

Cretaceous Limestones Altered

One aspect worth mentioning is that revised studies of the historical or evolutionary geology of the Lake Maracaibo sedimentary basin reveal clearly that its Cretaceous limestones have been altered over geological time by processes of a technical* type, which deformed them and, in suitable combination with conditions of strategic* type, created favorable situations for the entrapment of hydrocarbons.

According to data collected and verified by LAGOVEN's authorized spokesman, the principal Cretaceous structures in Perija are: Santa Rosa o Tokuko, San Jose, San Julian, Alturitas and Aricaiza.

As regards Lake Maracaibo, the principal structures are: Urdaneta, Icotea, Lama, Lamar, Lago Central, Tia Juana and Bachaquero.

LAGOVEN's exploratory effort in the Lake has as its purpose or basic objective the Cretaceous limestones, whereas in Perija oil is being sought in the Cretaceous**. Drilling of shallower wells is to start very soon in Perija, to evaluate the Paleocene and Eocene.

"In 1979," the spokesman said, "LAGOVEN found oil in the recently assigned area of the Urdaneta Corridor and in Perija. We started drilling activities in that district with the Alturitas-6 well, which produced more than 3,000 barrels a day.

"To date, through drillings in Perija with highly satisfactory results, Altos de Alturitas, San Jose and Aricaiza [as published--see previous spelling] have been evaluated.

"In San Julian, drilling of the San Julian-1 well started on 20 July, and this year Alto de Machiques will be evaluated. Alto de Santa Rosa o Tokuko will be evaluated later. Current seismic surveys and the results of drillings will help to define new prospection areas or to better delineate known ones for the planning of future programs."

* Translator's note: The terms "technical" and "strategic" in this passage are as published. Author's intended reference was probably to "tectonic" and "stratification" processes respectively.

** Translator's note: Author's intended distinction between "the Cretaceous limestones" and "the Cretaceous" in this passage, as published, is unclear, in that "the Cretaceous" used generically in a geological context such as this must be taken to mean the Cretaceous sedimentary sequence, which includes shale, sandstone, limestone, etc., one of which is generally predominant in any one zone.

By way of detail, according to LAGOVEN's authorized spokesman, we understand that LAGOVEN has discovered, through its exploratory work in the Lake Maracaibo basin, 476 million barrels of oil.

The breakdown is as follows: 407 million in previous concessions; 38 million in newly assigned areas or the Urdaneta Corridor; 31 million in areas of exploratory responsibility (Alturitas and San Jose).

"Up to now," our informant reiterated, "we have drilled 83 wells down to the Cretaceous limestones, including wildcat and development wells, and have come up with 65 producers, 13 dry wells, and 5 under current evaluation.

"As regards wildcat wells, our percentage of successes has been high--in the order of 60 percent.

"All of this intense activity has involved an investment in wildcat drilling of the order of 780 million bolivars, which represents a discovery cost of 1.63 bolivars per barrel, and which makes exploration of the Cretaceous attractive from the economic standpoint."

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